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The Billionaire’s Treasure Trove: A Call 
to Reform Private Art Museums and the 
Private Benefit Doctrine 
E. Alex Kirk* 
Thanks to the new generation of billionaire art collectors, and the re-
cent boom in the art market, a growing number of high-net-worth pa-
trons are creating their own tax-exempt private art museums. These 
“jewel-box” museums provide invaluable public benefits, lead to growth 
and innovation in the private museum sector, and encourage donors to 
pursue more avant-gardes collecting strategies. This advantageous tax-
saving strategy appeals to wealthy individuals, who wish to maintain 
control over their art collection, and still receive generous charitable in-
come tax deductions. However, several private museums have recently 
come under fire due to private benefit concerns. To qualify for federal tax 
exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, a pri-
vate museum must serve public rather than private interests. Ambiguity 
in the regulatory scheme has allowed some high-net-worth individuals to 
exploit loopholes in the tax law, which is silent on how these private mu-
seums should comply with the public benefit requirement, and the types 
of activities that constitute substantial, and therefore, impermissible pri-
vate benefits. The tax law is structured to incentivize charitable giving: 
Taxpayers can write off the cost of maintaining their art collections, sub-
sidize the cost of newly purchased artworks, and leave behind a lasting 
philanthropic legacy. It is practically impossible for private museums to 
not provide some sort of private benefit. 
                                                                                                                            
*  Editor-in-Chief, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 
Volume XXVIII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2018; B.A., Art 
History, Columbia University, 2011. The author would like to thank Professor Linda 
Sugin for her guidance and advice throughout the writing process, and the editors of the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their editing and 
feedback. The author would also like to extend a special thank you to her parents for their 
unconditional love and support. 
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This Note proposes to reform the limitations on private benefit with 
flexible guidelines that allow for involvement during the donor’s life-
time, provide these organizations with enough autonomy to carry out 
their unique charitable vision, and encourage charitable giving. Private 
benefit should continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in consid-
eration of the organization’s available resources, size, and funding. Any 
updates in the regulatory scheme should not foreclose on these charitable 
deductions altogether, and should be narrowly tailored to prevent only 
those activities with substantial enough private benefits to justify the re-
vocation of their tax-exempt status. Private museums that encourage 
public engagement with the arts and provide meaningful public benefits 
should still be entitled to tax exemption, and benefit from insubstantial 
nonexempt activities that effectuate their overall charitable purposes. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 872 
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ART 
MUSEUMS ................................................................. 876 
A. Requirements for Section 501(c)(3) Federal Tax 
Exemption .............................................................. 877 
B.  Billionaire “Super Collectors” and the Proliferation 
of the Private Museum ............................................. 878 
II.   THE TAX-SAVVY CONNOISSEUR .......................... 882 
A.   Charitable Deduction Limitations ........................... 883 
B. Favorable Tax Treatment of Private Operating 
Foundations ........................................................... 884 
III.  THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE ...................... 887 
A.   Private Inurement and Private Benefit Constraints .. 888 
B.  Operational and Organizational Tests Require 
Private Operating Foundations’ Tax-Exempt 
Activities Serve Their Intended Beneficiaries Rather 
than Private Interests .............................................. 891 
1. Organizational Test Considers a Private 
Museum’s “True” Purpose ........................... 892 
2. Operational Test: “Substantial” Private 
Benefits Threaten Tax-Exempt Status ........... 897 
C. Qualitative and Quantitative Tests Fail to Define 
What Types of Private Benefits Cross the Threshold 
from Permissible Incidental Benefits to 
2017] BILLIONAIRE’S TREASURE TROVE 871 
 
Impermissible Substantial Benefits ........................... 899 
D. Hatch Review Identifies Key Areas in the Tax Code 
Susceptible to Donor-Founder Abuse ........................ 903 
1.  Degree of Closeness to the Donor-Founder 
May Indicate Excessive Entanglement ...........904 
2. Congress Is Wary of Private Museums 
Situated Near a Donor-Founder’s 
Residence.. ..................................................... 905 
3. Limited Public Access Warrants Further 
Investigation into Whether These Private 
Museums Fall Short of the Public Benefit 
Requirement ................................................... 906 
IV.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ......................................908 
A. Tax Incentives Encourage Wealthy Individuals to 
Participate in the Private Museum Sector ................. 909 
B.   Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath Water! ..... 912 
1.  Any New IRS Guidelines Should Prevent 
Exploitation of the Tax Regime ...................... 915 
2.   Case Study: The Hill Art Foundation ............. 918 
V.   FACTORS TO ASSESS PRIVATE BENEFITS ............920 
A. Consider the of Size and Scale of Museums When 
Examining Visitor Data .......................................... 921 
B. Donor Involvement—Though Unorthodox—Leads 
to Innovative Results and Should Be Permissible So 
Long as the Private Benefit Is Not Egregious ............. 923 
C. Though the Proximity to the Founder’s Private 
Residence Is an Indicator of Abuse, Private 
Museums Play a Significant Role in Improving 
Local Economic and Cultural Development ............... 926 
D. Public Benefit Calls for Greater Public Access ............ 929 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 933 
 
872         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:869 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Museums are very much a part of the community, 
but that role is not well understood and [has not] 
been well publicized.” – Ford Bell1 
Due to the efforts of many forward-thinking wealthy individu-
als, the private museum sector has helped to transform the cultural 
landscape in the United States. This modern-day private museum 
“Renaissance” has signaled a major shift in the nonprofit art sec-
tor.2 Over ninety percent of artworks in American museums were 
donated by private collections, and some of the country’s most 
prized art museums started in private institutions.3 Part of the re-
cent boom in the private museum sector is attributable to the “sky-
rocketing value of art and the growing number of collectors who 
buy it as an investment . . . .”4 Thanks to the new generation of 
high-net-worth art collectors, a growing number of patrons are 
creating their own private exhibition spaces. Rather than donate to 
more established public museums, taxpayers can create their own 
private tax-exempt museums, which receive generous federal cha-
ritable tax deductions, and allow wealthy individuals to “write off” 
their private art collections.5 Charitable deductions save art collec-
tors millions of dollars by donating their art and assets to private 
operating foundations—“founders can deduct the full market val-
ue of any art, cash and stocks they donate, even when the museums 
are just a quick stroll from their living rooms.”6 
Along with the prestige and power that accompanies the crea-
tion of one’s own private museum, donor-founders’ are charged 
                                                                                                                            
1 A History of Museums, ‘The Memory of Mankind,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 24, 2008, 
1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=97377145 
[https://perma.cc/TY37-WSSQ]. 
2 Cat Weaver, When Private Art Collectors Go Public. Part 1: Ego, Branding, Power and 
Taxes, GALLERYINTELL (2013), http://www.galleryintell.com/when-private-collectors-go-
public-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/3SY9-88J7]. 
3 Patricia Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door: Art Collectors Gain Tax Benefits 
from Private Museums, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/ 
11/business/art-collectors-gain-tax-benefits-from-private-museums.html?_r=0 [https:// 
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with the social responsibility of providing meaningful public bene-
fits.7 Any artworks placed in a tax-exempt museum become cultural 
relics that belong in the public domain. The Internal Revenue Code 
(the “Code”) imposes minimal requirements to qualify for federal 
tax-exemption under section 501(c)(3), and only mandates that pri-
vate museums conduct charitable activities in furtherance of pub-
lic, rather private interests.8 Museums are “steward[s] of the pub-
lic trust,” and must appropriately dedicate their resources to serve 
the public good.9 These private “jewel-box museums”10 are com-
pelling in the long run: They provide unique public benefits that 
their public counterparts cannot, encourage public engagement 
with the arts, and safeguard some of the most influential fine art 
collections for generations to come. But as the nonprofit sector 
continues to grow, so does the potential for abuse by nonprofit arts 
organizations that benefit from federal tax exemptions.11 The In-
ternal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) has failed to clearly outline 
what constitutes a substantial enough private benefit to outweigh 
the public benefit, and justify the revocation of an organization’s 
tax-exempt status.12 Consequently, the private museum sector is 
left with little guidance on how to best carry out its charitable pur-
poses. 
Out of growing concern over whether these private operating 
foundations satisfy the public benefit requirement, Senator Orrin 
G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee (the 
“Committee”), recently conducted a review of eleven private tax-
exempt museums that focused on “the nature of the relationship 
                                                                                                                            
7 See Weaver, supra note 2. 
8 For background information on section 501(c)(3) and the public benefit requirement, 
see generally infra Section I.A. 
9 Code of Ethics for Museums, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS (2000), http://www.aam-
us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/ 
P78Y-HMN5]. 
10 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
11 Id. 
12 See generally Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., to 
John Koskinen, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (May 17, 2016), http://www.finance. 
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20IRS%20on%20Private%20Museums.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FXD8-DYKD]. 
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between the donor and museum,”13 summarizing his findings in a 
letter to IRS Commissioner John Koskinen.14 Senator Hatch 
launched the congressional inquiry (the “Inquiry”) in November 
2015 to investigate “bedrock institutions . . . that have long enjoyed 
preferential tax treatment.”15 Several factors were taken into ac-
count: The three most glaring issues were the amount of donor 
control over the foundation’s governance and assets, the degree of 
access provided to the general public, and the type of private bene-
fits, if any, these organizations impart on their founders.16 The 
Code appears to be fundamentally unfair if it is rigged in favor of 
wealthy art patrons who can create their own private exhibition 
spaces under the guise of a tax-exempt organization. Collectors 
may still be entitled to charitable tax deductions even if the organi-
zation affords the donor-founder significant private benefits, and is 
only open to the public on a limited basis, if at all. The investigation 
highlights the need to reevaluate whether these type of private mu-
seums should qualify for federal tax exemption, and if so, whether 
their tax-exempt status should be subject to certain limitations to 
ensure that these institutions’ activities are in furtherance of their 
charitable purposes.17 Unfortunately, the Committee failed to pro-
vide any explanation as to what standards should be in place, and 
how to resolve the ambiguities within the Code.18 The Inquiry sug-
                                                                                                                            
13 Among those surveyed were: Brant Foundation Art Study Center in Greenwich, 
Connecticut; The Broad in Los Angeles, California; El Segundo Museum of Art in El 
Segundo, California; Fisher Landau Center for Art in Queens, New York; Glenstone in 
Potomac, Maryland; Goss-Michael Foundation in Dallas, Texas; Hall Art Foundation in 
Reading, Vermont; Kreeger Museum in Washington, D.C.; Linda Pace Foundation in 
San Antonio, Texas; Pier 24 in San Francisco, California; and Rubell Family Collection in 
Miami, Florida. See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
14 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Hatch Concludes Review into Tax-
Exempt Private Museums, Notes Concerning Findings (June 2, 2016), http://www. 
finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-concludes-review-into-tax-exempt-private-
museums-notes-concerning-findings [https://perma.cc/KY8C-234P]. 
15 Patricia Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/business/tax-status-of-museums-
questioned-by-senators.html [https://perma.cc/J5U3-BR4H] [hereinafter Cohen, Tax 
Status of Museums Questioned by Senators]. 
16 Id. 
17 See Press Release, supra note 14. 
18 May Harris & Linda Rosenthal, Senate Review of Private Museums Ends with a 
Whimper, FOR PURPOSE L. GROUP (July 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.forpurposelaw. 
com/senate-review-private-museums-ends/ [https://perma.cc/A4UP-AP4Y] (observing 
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gests that some private museums may need to publicize how their 
charitable activities justify their tax-exempt status, or expand their 
facilities and programmatic efforts to better achieve their charitable 
purposes.19 
To better understand the tax treatment of private museums and 
collectors in the United States, this Note explores the public bene-
fit requirement under section 501(c)(3) of the Code, and the pri-
vate benefit doctrine. Part I of this Note recounts the requirements 
for federal tax exemption, the historical landscape of charitable giv-
ing in the arts, and recent developments in the Code, which depart 
from the traditional model of donating to public art museums in 
favor of encouraging wealthy art patrons to create their own private 
art museums. Part II examines the importance of charitable deduc-
tions, and the regulatory scheme governing private operating foun-
dations. Part III presents an overview of the private benefit doc-
trine that provides the necessary context for this Note. This Part 
describes the operational and organizational tests used to deter-
mine whether a private museum satisfies the public benefit re-
quirement, and the quantitative and qualitative tests utilized to as-
sess whether any private benefits conferred are substantial enough 
to warrant the revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status. 
Part IV devotes considerable discussion to the regulatory chal-
lenges that result from the current body of law, and addresses the 
possibilities for updating the regulatory scheme. Given the com-
plexity of the private benefit inquiry, this Note recommends that 
the IRS adopt flexible regulations and/or guidelines to help curb 
donor abuse, and evaluate private benefit on a case-by-case basis. 
Reform should aim to deter only those organizations that abuse the 
Code in furtherance of non-charitable purposes, rather than do 
away with the charitable deductions altogether. Though we want to 
control the dangers that excessive private benefits pose, there is 
concern that too stringent rules will destroy the majority of the tax 
benefits that incentivize donor participation in the private museum 
sector. Finally, Part V provides examples of how these private op-
                                                                                                                            
that the Committee’s “results are inconclusive; there are no clear commonalities or 
trends”). 
19 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
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erating foundations should avoid private benefits that may jeopard-
ize their tax-exempt status. 
I.   HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ART MUSEUMS 
“At its core, a museum is an educational organiza-
tion. Its primary purpose is to collect objects 
deemed worthy of preservation and to instruct the 
public through the presentation of exhibits and oth-
er activities generated by critical collecting.”20 
A museum is defined as “a public or private nonprofit institu-
tion . . . organized on a permanent basis for essentially educational 
and aesthetic purposes and which, using a professional staff . . . ” 
owns or acquires, cares for, and exhibits works of art on a regular 
schedule.21 There are as many as 17,000 museums in the United 
States, which draw crowds of more than 800 million people annual-
ly.22 Generally, a museum’s primary mission is to display objects 
and artworks from its collection, and provide access to the public 
for educational and scholarly purposes.23 The act of accessioning 
an artwork bestows a particular set of values.24 Museums play a vi-
tal role in curating their own canons of art history, and must act as 
“moral institutions.”25 Section I.A sets forth the requirements for 
private art museums to qualify for federal tax exemption under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Code, and Section I.B illustrates the rationale 
for wealthy art collectors to create their own private foundations, 
rather than donate to more established public organizations. 
                                                                                                                            
20 2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, 
INVESTORS, DEALERS, & ARTISTS 1341 (4th ed. 2012). 
21 2 C.F.R. § 3187.3(a)(1)–(3) (2017). 
22 Leila John, Comment, Museums and the Tax Collector: The Tax Treatment of Museums 
at the Federal, State, and Local Level, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 877, 883 (2013). 
23 Roberta Frey Gilboe, Museum Acquisitions 101: A Primer for Collectors, 1 ART & 
MUSEUM L.J. 105, 107 (2006). 
24 LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 20, at 1477; see also supra note 9 and accompanying 
text. 
25 Sue Hubbard, Personality of the Year, APOLLO, Dec. 1, 2010, at 26, 29 (quoting Sam 
Keller, Director of Fondation Beyeler). 
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A.   Requirements for Section 501(c)(3) Federal Tax Exemption 
The IRS’s charitable deduction-related regulation is the broad-
est method of oversight for the private museum sector, as there is 
little regulation of the art world.26 Section 501(c)(3) of the Code 
provides income tax exemption for organizations that qualify as 
“[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, 
organized and operated exclusively for . . . educational purpos-
es . . . .”27 Art museums qualify as an educational tax-exempt enti-
ty.28 Museums are civic centers: Art collections are held in a 
“[c]ustodial trust”29 that confers an intrinsic duty to satisfy the 
public benefit requirement.30 Ownership of a private tax-exempt 
exhibition space imposes an obligation for the founder to provide 
meaningful community and cultural engagement beyond mere con-
noisseurship.31 These tax-exempt organizations provide unique 
                                                                                                                            
26 See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
27 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Educational organizations are required to provide either: 
“(a) [t]he instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or 
developing his capabilities; or (b) the instruction of the public on subjects useful to the 
individual and beneficial to the community.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (2017). 
28 Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337, 343 (1980). Educational 
organizations include: “[m]useums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras, and other 
similar organizations.” § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), Ex. (4). 
29 Herrington J. Bryce, The Public’s Trust in Nonprofit Organizations: The Role of 
Relationship Marketing and Management, 49 CAL. MGMT. REV. 112, 122 (2007) (This trust 
is “recognized in nonprofit law, governance, and financial management, because all 
nonprofits are composed of, hold, and operate social assets for the benefit of a group or 
society.”). 
30 SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC 
1, 14 (2001), https://www.si.edu/Content/opanda/docs/Rpts2001/01.10.ArtPublic. 
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MZT-377F]. Museum programming should ensure: 
[P]rograms support its mission and public trust responsibilities[;] . . . 
programs are accessible and encourage participation of the widest 
possible audience consistent with its mission and resources[;] 
programs respect pluralistic values, traditions and concerns[;] 
revenue-producing activities and activities that involve relationships 
with external entities are compatible with the museum’s mission and 
support its public trust responsibilities[; and] programs promote the 
public good rather than individual financial gain. 
Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9. 
31 SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 5 (citing 
STEPHEN E. WEIL, The Proper Business of the Museum: Ideas or Thing?, in RETHINKING THE 
MUSEUM AND OTHER MEDITATIONS 43, 50 (1990)). See generally infra Section III.B.1 
(explaining that a private museum’s true purposes must be in furtherance of the public 
benefit). A private museum should actively conduct activities that are directly related to its 
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public benefits through exhibitions, educational programming, 
community outreach, and tourism revenue.32 Museums not only 
have a tremendous impact on “the representation of a community 
and its highest values and truths,” but also help “define the rela-
tive standing of individuals within that community.”33 Conse-
quently, those in control of museums determine “[w]hat we see 
and do not see in art museums—and on what terms and by whose 
authority we do or do not see it.”34 The level of influence these 
founders have over the “cultural experience[s]” in their communi-
ties is inexorably linked to the public benefit of these institutions, 
and this complex relationship is primarily the reason why these pri-
vate museums have become the subject of such fierce scrutiny.35 
B.   Billionaire “Super Collectors” and the Proliferation of the Private 
Museum 
The burgeoning private art museum sector in the United States 
is not a new trend.36 Since the nineteenth century, notable art pa-
trons and philanthropists in the United States have devoted invalu-
able resources to form their own private museums.37 As the au-
dience for museums matured throughout the nineteenth century, 
the public grew to appreciate the cultural value and immense trans-
formative power of these public exhibition spaces.38 During the 
twentieth century, the general consensus among the art world cog-
noscenti shifted away from this ideal toward the modern view of 
the “aesthetic” museum,39 as more private collectors “were simp-
ly being more true to their own calling than to existing institu-
                                                                                                                            
declared tax-exempt educational purposes. Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-2(a)(2)(i) (2017) 
(emphasis added); cf. § 53.4942(b)-2(a)(6), Ex. (2). 
32 John, supra note 22, at 891. 
33 Carol Duncan, The Art Museum as Ritual, in THE ART OF ART HISTORY: A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY 424, 425 (Donald Preziosi ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
34 Id. 
35 See id. 
36 See, e.g., Leonard F. Charla, Museum Acquisition Transactions: Issues for Sellers and 
Donors of Art Collections, 1 ART & MUSEUM L. J. 157, 159–60 (2006). 
37 ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS, PRIVATE COLLECTORS, AND THE 
PUBLIC BENEFIT 1, 1 (2007), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/ 
PrivateCollectors3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ3M-JSLR] [hereinafter PRIVATE 
COLLECTORS, AND THE PUBLIC BENEFIT]. 
38 See Duncan, supra note 33, at 432. 
39 See id. at 430. 
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tions.”40 Given the rising popularity of private museums in Eu-
rope, the opportunity for connoisseurship attracted many wealthy 
individuals in the United States, who desired to amass world-class 
art collections that would come to rival their more storied Euro-
pean counterparts.41 Several prominent museums in the United 
States started off as private collections, including the Isabella Ste-
wart Gardner Museum, J. Paul Getty Museum, Frick Collection, 
Barnes Foundation, and Morgan Library and Museum.42 These 
private museums help to define “the cultural landscape for genera-
tions” within the United States.43 
Today, there are more than forty-three private art museums in 
the United States, the second-highest number of private museums 
in the world.44 This number has skyrocketed since 2000,45 correlat-
ing with the overall growth of philanthropic efforts within the arts 
and culture charitable sector.46 In 2015, the national average for 
total charitable giving in the United States rose by an average of 
                                                                                                                            
40 David D’Arcy, Making a Show of It: A Look at the Rising Trend that Sees Art Buyers 
Creating Their Own Museums, NATIONAL (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.thenational.ae/ 
arts-life/art/20160813/making-a-show-of-it-a-look-at-the-rising-trend-that-sees-art-
buyers-creating-their-own-museums#full [https://perma.cc/J3P8-HAN2]. 
41 See Charla, supra note 36. 
42 See, e.g., Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15; 
Michael Shnayerson, Inside the Private Museums of Billionaire Art Collectors, TOWN & 
COUNTRY (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.townandcountrymag.com/leisure/arts-and-
culture/a9124/private-museums-of-billionaires/ [https://perma.cc/8RBT-SCA4]. 
43 D’Arcy, supra note 40 (“Barnes’s own wall arrangements were sacrosanct.”); see 
also infra Section III.B.1 (providing background information on the history of the Barnes 
Foundation). 
44 Julia Halperin, US Senate Committee Submits Private Museum Findings to Internal 
Revenue Service, ART NEWSPAPER (June 2, 2016), http://theartnewspaper.com/news/us-
senate-committee-submits-private-museum-findings-to-internal-revenue-service/ 
[https://perma.cc/6NCK-YEN4] (attributing the count to the collector’s database 
“Larry’s List”). 
45 Jessie A. Crawford, Art for One or Art for All? Exploring the Role and Impact of 
Private Collection Museums in the United States 39 (2016) (unpublished B.A. thesis, 
Ohio State University) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal). “[Fifty-three percent] of the world’s private contemporary 
art museums were founded between 2001 and 2010,” of which eighteen percent were 
founded since 2010. Benjamin Sutton, Crunching the Numbers Behind the Boom in Private 
Art Museums, HYPERALLERGIC (Jan. 21, 2016), http://hyperallergic.com/269548/ 
crunching-the-numbers-behind-the-boom-in-private-art-museums/ [https://perma.cc/ 
47UG-WQFQ]. 
46 Crawford, supra note 45, at 19. 
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4.1% over the previous year—total giving by individuals increased 
by 3.8%, totaling $264.68 billion; whereas charitable giving within 
the arts and cultural sector increased by seven percent, totaling an 
estimated $17.07 billion.47 The recent boom in the number of pri-
vate museums can be attributed, in part, to the massive influx in 
disposable income, “an insatiable public interest in art,” and a de-
sire to benchmark one’s social and financial status (keeping up with 
the Joneses).48 The eleven private art foundations that Senator 
Hatch reviewed collectively have assets worth more than $1.6 bil-
lion.49 Moreover, the increase in the number of private museums 
has deeply impacted the public art museum sector.50 The majority 
of museums tend to rely primarily on wealthy donors, rather than 
government funding.51 More established museums struggle to keep 
up with the rapidly increasing art market, and are often outbid at 
auction by wealthy collectors.52 Private museums tend to be richer 
institutions than their public counterparts: These institutions re-
quire large endowments to guarantee their long-term survival,53 
and require an immense amount of capital—especially for those 
that collect contemporary art.54 Though these smaller private insti-
tutions are unlikely to entirely supplant funding of more estab-
                                                                                                                            
47 Giving USA: 2015 Was America’s Most-Generous Year Ever, GIVING USA (June 13, 
2016), https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2016/ [https://perma.cc/64S3-HMSJ]; cf. 
Crawford, supra note 45, at 19 (noting that in 2014, the national average for charitable 
giving in the United States rose by an average of 7.1%, whereas charitable giving within the 
arts and cultural sector increased by 9.2%—the largest percentage of growth for any of the 
charitable subsectors). 
48 Carol Kino, Welcome to the Museum of My Stuff, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/arts/design/18kino.html [https://perma.cc/ 
72C3-FUWC]. 
49 Halperin, supra note 44 (referring to the eleven organizations’ 2013 tax returns). 
50 See Kino, supra note 48. 
51 Museum Facts, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/about-
museums/museum-facts [https://perma.cc/4CSF-VT4T] (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
52 See, e.g., D’Arcy, supra note 40; Increasing Number of Private Museums Stir Debate in 
Art World, PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (Apr. 8, 2008), http://philanthropynewsdigest. 
org/news/increasing-number-of-private-museums-stir-debate-in-art-world [https:// 
perma.cc/4RWF-R2GN] [hereinafter PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG.]. 
53 Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
54 Andrew M. Goldstein, Interview Magazine Owner Peter Brant on the New 
“Renaissance” in American Art, ARTSPACE (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.artspace.com/ 
magazine/interviews_features/how_i_collect/how_i_collect_peter_brant-52192 
[https://perma.cc/W9UL-5GL4]. 
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lished museums, their growth signifies a major “power shift within 
the art world . . . .”55 
The “paradox is that even as traditional museums depend on 
these private collectors for loans and gifts, they can only show a 
fraction of the art that they borrow or receive as donations.”56 The 
majority of public museums only display about five percent of their 
holdings at any given time, whereas the number for private mu-
seums hovers around ten percent.57 One rationale for the growth of 
private museums is that donating to more established museums can 
be more difficult for collectors.58 This sentiment is growing on a 
global scale, as more collectors have become frustrated with the 
institutional constraints of donating to public arts institutions.59 
Museums tend to be “selective about what they accept,” and the 
majority do not focus on collecting contemporary art, which many 
consider to be a riskier practice.60 Donors are aware of the risk that 
these major museums may turn around and sell any donated art in 
order to stay competitive. Founding a private art exhibition space 
guarantees that the donor’s collection will be on display, and “lev-
el[s] the playing field between collectors and museum profession-
als . . . .”61 Many collectors wish to share their remarkable collec-
tions with the public, and are able to act in furtherance of the gen-
eral public interest by creating their own innovative private mu-
seums within the nonprofit sector.62 
                                                                                                                            
55 Kino, supra note 48. 
56 D’Arcy, supra note 40. 
57 E.g., Michael O’Hare, Capitalizing Art Museum Collections: Awkward for Museums but 
Good for Art and for Society 2, 9 (Goldman Sch. Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. GSPP08-
005, Nov. 2005); PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG., supra note 52. 
58 See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.; see also Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
61 Kino, supra note 48. For example, Eli Broad refused to donate a significant portion of 
his contemporary art collection to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, including 
works by Jeff Koons, Ed Rusha, and Cindy Sherman, after the museum would not agree 
to keep most of the work on permanent exhibition. Broad instead founded his own private 
museum, which is now one of Los Angeles’ foremost cultural gems. DON THOMPSON, 
THE $12 MILLION STUFFED SHARK: THE CURIOUS ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPORARY ART 
219 (Palgrave MacMillan 2008); Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
62 Charla, supra note 36, at 163. 
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II.   THE TAX-SAVVY CONNOISSEUR 
“[I]f you were to walk up to the typical U.S. mu-
seum director and ask, ‘How are American mu-
seums funded?’ . . . [Y]ou would get a simple, 
straightforward answer: ‘Precariously.’”  
    – Ford W. Bell63 
In the United States, cultural development is furthered largely 
through the tax treatment of museums: The Code is structured to 
provide nonprofit organizations with a significant amount of lee-
way, and there is little regulation of the charitable sector.64 A mu-
seum’s level of accountability is determined by its legal status, yet 
the Code has struggled to keep up with the development of private 
museums.65 The current regulatory scheme reflects the view that 
“[e]verything about the substance of the tax law defines charity as 
fundamentally private. The tax law contemplates private creation, 
private governance, and private funding of exempt organiza-
tions.”66 Despite the underlying private nature of the charitable 
sector, the rules governing private collection museums mirror 
those originally created to oversee “the legal status and manage-
ment structure . . . [of their] public counterpart.”67 Consequently, 
the systems in place to qualify for tax-exemption fail to take into 
account some of the unique organizational and management struc-
tures of private art museums as discussed in the following sec-
tions.68 
                                                                                                                            
63 Stacy Perman, Billionaire Art Museums, BARRON’S (Nov. 29, 2014, 2:41 AM), 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/billionaire-art-museums-1417230557 [https://perma.cc 
/VE22-4B4S]. 
64 See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2607, 2614 (2016). 
65 Crawford, supra note 45, at 34. 
66 Sugin, supra note 64. 
67 See Crawford, supra note 45, at 34–35. 
68 See generally id. For example, “[t]he use of an art foundation to administer a 
collection affords individuals key benefits: tax deductions, tax exemptions, tax deferrals, 
and continued control. Accordingly, collectors are able to continue to enjoy and manage 
their collections while minimizing their overall tax liability.” Richard M. Horwood, Being 
“Tax-Wise” When Managing an Art Collection, 33 J. TAX’N INV., no. 2, 2016, at 19, 28. 
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A.   Charitable Deduction Limitations 
The Code imposes several percentage limitations on the total 
amount of allowable deductions for charitable contributions made 
by a donor within the taxable year, either in cash or other property, 
or during a subsequent carryover year.69 Charitable deductions vary 
based on the type of property donated, and the legal status of the 
organization.70 Typically, an art collection is “capital gain proper-
ty,” which tends to receive more favorable tax treatment.71 A do-
nor is allowed a charitable contribution deduction for the donation 
of long-term capital gain property—assets that the donor held for 
more than one year, or property that appreciates in value—equal to 
the property’s fair market value (“FMV”).72 This allows donors to 
deduct the full value of an artwork at the time of the deduction, and 
benefit from any appreciation in value.73 Section 501(c)(3) entities 
are divided into private foundations and public charities.74 General-
ly, a donor may deduct up to fifty percent of their adjusted gross 
income (“AGI”) for an enumerated group of charitable contribu-
tions, including: churches, traditional educational institutions, hos-
pitals and medical research, governmental units, and private foun-
dations.75 Public charities receive more favorable tax treatment 
than private foundations: They are limited to thirty percent AGI 
for capital gain property, and may deduct the FMV at the date of 
the gift; and are limited to fifty percent AGI of the donor’s contri-
bution base for any gifts in the form of ordinary income property or 
cash.76 
A private foundation “does not itself carry on any charitable ac-
tivities but rather receives funds from a limited number of do-
                                                                                                                            
69 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (2012). 
70 See generally § 170. 
71 § 170(b)(1)(C)(iv). 
72 See § 170(e); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(d)(3) (2017). “The fair market value is 
the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts.” § 1.170A-1(c)(2). 
73 See, e.g., §§ 1.170A-8(d)(3), 1.170A-4(b)(2); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR USE IN PREPARING 2016 RETURNS, pub. 526, no. 15050A, at 11 (Jan. 
19, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ8F-KZ5U]. 
74 § 170(b)(1). 
75 § 170(b)(1)(A). 
76 See generally § 170(b)(1)(C). 
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nors—frequently a single wealthy individual—and then invests or 
distributes those funds to other 501(c)(3) organizations.”77 Private 
foundations are subject to more stringent rules than public charities 
due to their sources of financial support, and the ability for donors 
to exert greater control over the organization.78 For example, pri-
vate foundations are limited to a twenty percent deduction of AGI 
for capital gain contributions made within the taxable year, with a 
five-year carry-forward period.79 Still, private foundations create 
three major tax incentives for donors: (1) an income tax deduction 
for each taxable year during which the charitable contribution is 
made; (2) avoidance of capital gains taxes based on the property 
donated; and (3) a reduction, or possibly an elimination, of estate 
taxes.80 
B.   Favorable Tax Treatment of Private Operating Foundations 
Private foundations are divided into two types of organizations. 
The first of the two are nonoperating foundations, which generally 
provide support to charitable organizations through grants and oth-
er financial means.81 Nonoperating foundations are limited to the 
twenty percent charitable deduction of the taxpayer’s basis,82 and 
cannot deduct the FMV for donated artworks.83 Most private mu-
seums fall under the second category as operating foundations, 
which are organizations that “directly” devote their assets or in-
come to “the active conduct of the activities constituting” the cha-
ritable or educational purpose “for which it is organized and oper-
ated.”84 Given the differences in “organizational management,” 
                                                                                                                            
77 Michael Fricke, The Case Against Income Tax for Nonprofits, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1129, 1178 (2015) (citing I.R.C. § 509 (2012)). 
78 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DOMESTIC PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, TAX YEAR 2013, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/2013privatefoundationsonesheet.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/79LP-SGGC] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). See generally § 170(b)(1). 
79 § 170(b)(1)(D)(i)–(ii). 
80 What Is a Private Foundation?, FOUND. SOURCE, https://www.foundationsource. 
com/learn-about-foundations/what-is-a-private-foundation/ [https://perma.cc/G657-
48VK] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
81 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 78. 
82 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
83 § 170(b)(1)(D)(i). 
84 I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3)(A) (2012). “Substantially all” has been interpreted to mean an 
amount “equal[] [to] at least [eighty-five] percent of [the] foundation’s adjusted net 
income . . . .” Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-1(c) (2017). For the purposes of section 4942(j), 
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taxpayers generally choose to form a private operating foundation, 
which are afforded greater tax deductions than other private grant-
making foundations, and receive generous tax treatment similar to 
public charities.85 
Like public charities, private operating foundations are subject 
to the thirty percent and fifty percent deduction limitations.86 Any 
charitable contribution of capital gain property is limited to thirty 
percent AGI of the taxpayer’s contribution base for the taxable 
year, and may deduct the full FMV at the date of the gift.87 A tax-
payer may elect to increase the limit of the charitable contribution 
base to fifty percent AGI for the taxable year, but is not entitled to 
deduct the full FMV.88 If the taxpayer choses to make such an elec-
tion, the amount of the deduction is limited to the taxable year in 
which the contribution was made.89 Donors may carry over any de-
duction amount in excess for each of the following five years.90 Ad-
ditionally, a donor must transfer her entire interest in the property 
to the foundation, and cannot benefit from any interest that would 
increase the value of the property once donated.91 Operating foun-
dations are far more beneficial to donors than private nonoperating 
foundations, who may deduct the full FMV of any property do-
nated.92 The FMV deduction is particularly compelling for donors 
who wish to gift artworks that they have owned for a long time, and 
have significantly appreciated in value.93 Creating a private mu-
                                                                                                                            
“adjusted net income” is the excess of the gross income over the total amount of the 
deductions for the taxable year. § 4942(f)(1)(A)–(B). 
85 Compare supra text accompanying notes 78–79, 82–83, with infra text accompanying 
notes 86–93. 
86 See § 170(b)(1)(C); see also notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
87 § 170(b)(1)(C)(i), (iv). 
88 § 170(b)(1)(C)(ii)–(iii), (d)(1)(A). 
89 § 170(b)(1)(C)(iii). 
90 See § 170(d)(1)(A). A donor may carry over any amount of charitable contributions 
that cannot be deducted during the current taxable year because they are in excess of the 
donor’s AGI limits. Id. 
91 Samuel G. Wieczorek, Winokur, Lose, or Draw: Art Collectors Lose an Important Tax 
Break, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 90, 94 (2008) (citing I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2006)). 
92 See § 170(b)(1)(C). 
93 Id. For example, a donor owns a painting with a FMV of $10,000 at the time of the 
donation, but only purchased the artwork for $5,000 (the donor’s basis). If the donor gifts 
the painting to a private operating foundation, then she is may deduct the full FMV. In 
comparison, if the donor were to gift the painting to a private nonoperating foundation, 
886         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:869 
 
seum also provides certain tax-saving advantages over donating to 
more established museums. Donors do not have to report as in-
come any appreciation of value in the donated artworks, or any 
charitable contributions in the form of cash, subject to the fifty per-
cent limitation.94 Furthermore, any assets or property donated are 
not subject to estate tax if the donor wishes to bequeath these to a 
private operating foundation, in the event of his or her death.95 
An operating foundation must satisfy the income test, which 
requires that it make “substantial” qualifying distributions for its 
exempt purposes, equal to the lesser amount of either its adjusted 
net income or its minimum investment return.96 Additionally, an 
operating foundation must satisfy either one of the following three 
alternative tests: the assets test, endowment test, or support test.97 
Private museums generally meet the requirements for the assets 
test, which mandates that “substantially more than half of the as-
sets . . . are devoted directly to” its tax-exempt activities.98 To 
qualify for the FMV deduction for a charitable contribution of an 
artwork, an organization must use such property in a manner re-
lated to its tax-exempt purpose under section 501(c)(3), or “to or 
for the use of a private foundation,” unless indicated otherwise in 
the Code.99 An operating foundation must use the qualifying distri-
bution itself, and must directly engage in activities that promote its 
charitable purpose.100 Accordingly, a private museum cannot oper-
ate solely in a grant-making capacity, as this only helps other organ-
izations achieve their charitable purposes rather than its own.101 
                                                                                                                            
then her charitable deduction is limited to $5,000, and she cannot benefit from any 
appreciation in value. See generally § 170(b)(1). 
94 See generally I.R.C. §§ 170, 4942 (2012). 
95 Horwood, supra note 68, at 27. 
96 § 4942(j)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). 
97 See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-2 (2017). “Substantially more than half” has 
been interpreted to mean at least sixty-five percent of the organization’s assets. 
§ 53.4942(b)-2(a)(5). 
98 § 4942(j)(3)(B)(i). 
99 § 170(e)(1)(B)(i)–(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(i) (2017); see also INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., ART GALLERIES – AUDIT TECHNIQUE GUIDE 21 (2012), https://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-utl/artgalleries.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AWK-QXCG]. 
100 § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1). 
101 See id. “[I]f a foundation does no more than select, screen, and investigate applicants 
for grants or scholarships, pursuant to which the recipients perform their work or studies 
alone or exclusively under the direction of some other organization, such grants or 
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Certain expenditures that assist the donor’s foundation in directly 
carrying out its tax-exempt purposes are considered to be qualify-
ing distributions.102 Such qualifying distributions include the acqui-
sition or maintenance of a museum’s operating assets (i.e., pur-
chasing artworks), administrative expenses, and operating funds 
set aside for special projects such as the acquisition, restoration, or 
construction of additional facilities.103 
III.   THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE 
“I think these types of deals do not follow the in-
tent, even if they follow the letter, of the 
law . . . . They feed into the idea that the system is 
rigged toward the wealthy.” – Rebecca Wilkins104 
To qualify for federal tax exemption, an organization must 
show that its overall charitable purpose serves the public good, as 
opposed to private interests; however, public benefit is a subjective 
standard left open to interpretation.105 Section 501(c)(3) imposes 
certain non-distribution constraints, and prohibits tax-exempt or-
ganizations from providing private benefits to any individuals who 
are not the intended public beneficiaries.106 The Code was envi-
saged to prevent private foundations from “subsidizing private 
transactions . . . with a charitable contribution income tax deduc-
tion to the foundation’s donor.”107 Thus, founders of tax-exempt 
organizations should not engage in conduct in furtherance of their 
own self-interest that conflicts with the interests of the museum’s 
intended charitable class.108 Section III.A illustrates the key differ-
                                                                                                                            
scholarships will not be treated as qualifying distributions made directly for the active 
conduct of the foundation’s exempt activities.” § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(2)(i). 
102 § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1). 
103 Id. 
104 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
105 See Fricke, supra note 77, at 1139 (discussing “a 1939 House Committee Report 
[which] states that the exemption is meant for those organizations that provide ‘benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 
(1938))). 
106 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)–(2) (2017). 
107 DAY PITNEY LLP, RUNNING YOUR OWN CHARITY: LEGAL BASICS OF PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS 5 (2013). 
108 See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d); see also Fricke, supra note 77, at 1139. 
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ence between the private inurement and private benefit doctrines. 
Section III.B and Section III.C lay out the operational and organiza-
tion tests, and qualitative and quantitative tests used to assess 
whether a private benefit is substantial enough to disqualify an or-
ganization’s tax-exempt status.109 Lastly, Section III.D recounts 
the findings from the recent Senate Finance Committee Inquiry 
into the extent that these private art museums afford their donor-
founders private benefits, and illustrates the difficulty in assessing 
the public benefit requirement. 
A.   Private Inurement and Private Benefit Constraints 
Private inurement is clearly defined in the Code: An organiza-
tion may only quality for tax-exemption if “no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or in-
dividual . . . .”110 Private inurement is characterized as a transaction 
involving the “diversion of charitable assets to an insider; in effect, 
it is an insider stealing from the charity.”111 These type of transac-
tions primarily occur when an insider is overcompensated for 
property given to the charitable organization or for services ren-
dered, or the charitable organization is undercompensated for the 
economic value that the insider benefits from.112 Conversely, the 
rules surrounding private benefit are less palpable. These provi-
sions are derived from the private inurement limitation, and are 
“tucked away” in the Code.113 The Department of the Treasury 
regulations provide a more modern approach to the prohibition 
against private benefits, stating: 
An organization is not . . . [qualified for exemption] 
unless it serves a public rather than a private inter-
est. Thus, . . . it is necessary for an organization to 
                                                                                                                            
109 See John D. Colombo, Using Donations to Set the Boundaries of Charitable Tax 
Exemption, NAT’L CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & L. ANN. CONF. PROC. 1, 31 (2015) 
[hereinafter Colombo, Using Donations]. 
110 § 501(c)(3). “The words private shareholder or individual in section 501 refer to 
persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.” 
§ 1.501(a)-1(c). 
111 Colombo, Using Donations, supra note 109, at 38. 
112 Id. 
113 John, supra note 22, at 892 (citing Micah J. Burch, National Funding for the Arts and 
the Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3), 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 303, 303 (2010)). 
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establish that it is not organized or operated for the 
benefit of private interests such as designated indi-
viduals, the creator or his family, shareholders of 
the organization, or persons controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such private interests.114 
Private benefit is more of a balancing test that considers the 
public and private interests at stake, and is evaluated on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether the transaction involved contra-
venes the private benefit limitation under section 501(c)(3).115 
There are two key distinctions that differentiate private benefit 
from private inurement. The first is that private inurement is a 
general rule that disqualifies an organization for even a single trans-
action that confers a private benefit, regardless of whether the or-
ganization’s overall activities are in furtherance of its charitable 
purposes.116 With private benefit, a single transaction is not alone 
disqualifying.117 Rather, the private benefit restriction forbids 
transactions that serve more private interests than public.118 
Second, private inurement focuses on “insiders” within the organ-
ization (i.e., officers or directors).119 Private benefit applies to any 
“disinterested persons” outside of the intended charitable class 
who receive benefits from the tax-exempt organization’s activities, 
and is not only limited to insiders.120 The definition of a disquali-
fied person extends to any family member of an insider (i.e., a 
spouse, ancestor, child, grandchild, great grandchild, or the spouse 
of such qualifying individual’s children, grandchildren, or great 
                                                                                                                            
114 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii); see also John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 
FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2006) [hereinafter Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit]. 
115 See Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, supra note 114, at 1072–73. 
116 Id. at 1083. 
117 Id. at 1072–73. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. at 1073; Andrew Megosh et al., Private Benefit Under I.R.C. 501(C)(3), in 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL 
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 135, 139 (2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/X3N3-7SUB]. 
120 Megosh et al., supra note 119. “Disqualified persons are ‘insiders’ - individuals and 
organizations that have, or are likely to have, a close relationship with a private 
foundation. Note that a corporation or other entity can be a disqualified person, despite 
the ordinary meaning of the term ‘person.’” DAY PITNEY LLP, supra note 107. 
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grandchildren).121 In fact, the majority of private benefit cases in-
volve some “entities or persons that have some relationship with 
the persons controlling the exempt organization.”122 To minimize 
risk, private museums should generally avoid transactions that fa-
vor disqualified persons as much as possible.123 
Private benefit extends beyond explicit financial transactions or 
stealing, and is as a result, generally more difficult to gauge.124 The 
two doctrines come into conflict with one another in the context of 
private museums, where donor-founders or “insiders” often re-
ceive private benefits—either tangible or intangible.125 Certain tax-
saving strategies raise the issue of the perceived fairness of the 
Code, especially when wealthy donors are able to subsidize expen-
sive art purchases.126 Private operating foundations offer donors 
clear advantages over public charities, such as exclusive control 
over their art collections, how the foundation’s assets are managed, 
grant-making and programming decisions, and the overall gover-
nance structure.127 For example, donor-founders can deduct any 
cash or stock assets contributed to a private operating foundation 
to cover the ordinary and necessary expenses in connection with 
the management, maintenance, or conservation of any property 
held by the organization.128 These foundations “can write off the 
cost of conserving, caring for and insuring the art, as well as design-
                                                                                                                            
121 I.R.C. § 4946(d) (2012). 
122 Megosh et al., supra note 119. 
123 DAY PITNEY LLP, supra note 107; see also Colombo, Using Donations, supra note 109, 
at 32 (“[I]n any particular transaction between a charity and an actor outside the 
charitable class, they should ask themselves whether the transaction appears to be 
structured more toward enriching the outside actors than helping the charitable class; if 
the former, then alarm bells should ring loudly, although they [will not] really know if a 
problem exists without litigation.”). 
124 Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 138–39. 
125 Id. at 144. See generally NAT’L ASSEMBLY OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, WHY SHOULD 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THE ARTS? 5–7 (2010), http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ 
files/83/en/US-WhyGovSupport2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H4N-FQ5W]. 
126 See Steven Rodgers, Comment, Donate Your Art and Keep It Too: How the 
Government Subsidizes Art Collections for the Rich and What Congress Can Do About It, 40 
S. ILL. UNIV. L. J. 45, 47 (2015). 
127 What Is a Private Foundation?, supra note 80 (“When assets are contributed to a 
private foundation, they are excluded from the donor’s estate and, as a result, are not 
subject to either federal or state estate taxes.”). 
128 I.R.C. § 4942(f)(3)(A) (2012). 
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ing and building exhibition and storage facilities.”129 Art founda-
tions’ purchases of artworks are also exempt from “state and local 
sales taxes . . . , [thereby] reducing the overall cost borne by a col-
lector for acquiring a new object.”130 By founding private art mu-
seums, high-net-worth individuals can also avoid paying estate tax-
es, and simultaneously serve a charitable interest that contributes 
to their philanthropic legacy.131 Public opinion, though rife with 
misconceptions about museums and their finances, has gradually 
shifted toward questioning why such wealthy charitable organiza-
tions merit tax exemption.132 Consequently, private museums that 
do not conduct activities in furtherance of their charitable pur-
pose—to benefit the general public—may warrant further investi-
gation into their status as tax-exempt organizations. 
B.   Operational and Organizational Tests Require Private Operating 
Foundations’ Tax-Exempt Activities Serve Their Intended 
Beneficiaries Rather than Private Interests 
In American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, the Tax Court 
defined private benefit as “nonincidental benefits conferred on dis-
interested persons [that] serve private interests.”133 Under section 
501(c)(3), “an organization must be both organized and operated 
exclusively for one or more” exempt purposes,134 and is not ex-
empt if it fails to satisfy either test.135 To satisfy the requirements, 
an organization must show “that it is not organized or operated for 
the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the 
creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”136 
Whether an organization’s activities serve private interests is a 
“factual determination” that requires the organization to show 
                                                                                                                            
129 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
130 Horwood, supra note 68, at 27. 
131 Id. at 25 (“In addition to an income tax deduction, as with noncharitable gifts, the 
collector receives the benefit of removing the artwork from his or her estate for estate tax 
purposes.”); see also What Is a Private Foundation?, supra note 80. 
132 John, supra note 22, at 889. 
133 92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989). 
134 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2017). 
135 Id. 
136 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). 
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that it “serves public rather than private interests.”137 However, 
the Code is unclear on how much public benefit is necessary to 
warrant the enormous tax breaks afforded to wealthy art collec-
tors.138 Tax-exempt organizations are inherently private, and are 
afforded a fair amount of autonomy by the government.139 In reali-
ty, it is incredibly difficult to identify when a private benefit be-
comes substantial enough to raise concern140—essentially all cha-
ritable organizations conduct activities that confer some sort of pri-
vate benefit.141 
1.    Organizational Test Considers a Private Museum’s 
“True” Purpose 
To satisfy the organizational test, “the organizational docu-
ments must limit the mission of the organization to one or more 
exempt purposes; limit the organization’s power to engage in non-
exempt activities[;] . . . and provide that the organization’s assets 
must be distributed for other related exempt purposes upon disso-
lution.”142 A private operating foundation should clearly define 
what audience it aims to serve, and how its resources are allo-
cated.143 Problems arise when the museum declares a number of 
charitable purposes that may be in conflict with one another.144 
                                                                                                                            
137 Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 135–36. 
138 See Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15. 
139 See Sugin, supra note 64 (citing EVELYN BRODY & JOHN TYLER, HOW PUBLIC IS 
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY? SEPARATING REALITY FROM MYTH (1st ed. 2009)). “[T]he law 
recognizes ‘the importance of philanthropic independence, respects philanthropies as 
private entities, and accord[s] them the right to autonomy without undue government or 
public direction and control.’” Id. (citing BRODY & TYLER, supra, at 11). 
140 See id. (“[T]he tax law contains no system for evaluating how well a public interest is 
served . . . .”); accord Colombo, Using Donations, supra note 109, at 30 (“No one 
(including the IRS) can adequately define what it is or when it becomes a problem, for a 
simple reason: literally all the activities of a charity provide private benefit in some form, 
including directly to the charitable class and indirectly to a whole host of actors outside 
the charitable class as a result of actually serving the charitable class.”). 
141 Id. 
142 John, supra note 22, at 887 (quoting Andras Kosaras, Note, Federal Income and State 
Property Tax Exemption of Commercialized Nonprofits: Should Profit-Seeking Art Museums Be 
Tax Exempt?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 128–29 (2000)). 
143 See Megosh et al., supra note 119. 
144 Cf. Mission and Institutional Planning, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-
us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/mission-and-planning [https:// 
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Under the current tax regime, whether the institution actually pro-
vides a “clear public benefit” is subject to sole discretion of the 
individual in control.145 Though the actual use of the charitable gift 
is within the donor’s broad discretion, the public trust is vested in 
that discretion, partly because of the organization’s self-proclaimed 
mission or charitable purpose.146 The Tax Court will consider the 
tax-exempt “organization’s true purpose, not the stated purpose or 
the organizational language.”147 Given the particularly challenging 
nature of this inquiry, “[t]he best guide is the actual result or oper-
ation of an organization’s activities.”148 A private museum that 
conducts educational activities will not qualify for exemption if the 
true purpose “was to benefit private interests.”149 Therefore, a 
private museum should only conduct activities consistent with its 
goals and public purpose. 
Private operating foundations pose a unique challenge in satis-
fying the organizational test, as they are not expressly required to 
be open to the public.150 The Code only stipulates that a tax-
exempt organization’s mission provide a “public benefit.”151 Pri-
vate operating foundations may conduct several types of tax-
exempt activities such as: the “exhibition of an art collection in the 
foundation’s own museum,”152 lending artworks to other 501(c)(3) 
organizations, grant-making or payments to individual beneficiaries 
that directly relate to the organization’s exempt activities, or allow-
                                                                                                                            
perma.cc/YJ2X-76GR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (“A museum’s mission statement is 
the primary benchmark against which to evaluate . . . [its] performance.”). 
145 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
146 Bryce, supra note 29, at 114, 119. 
147 See Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 139. 
148 Id. at 140. 
149 See Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 140 (citing Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 
T.C. 1053 (1989)). 
150 For example, a tax-exempt organization “devoted to improving the public’s 
understanding of Renaissance art” meets the requirements under section 501(c)(3). 
Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-2(a)(6), Ex. (4) (2017). Eighty percent of its assets are a 
collection of Renaissance paintings that the organization lends “to museums and schools 
for public display.” Id. Despite the fact that the organization “does not have a building in 
which it displays these paintings,” it still satisfies the assets test if “such paintings are 
devoted directly to the active conduct of activities constituting [its] exempt purpose.” Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Horwood, supra note 68, at 27. 
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ing researchers to access the collection.153 Generally, “[e]xhibition 
and access are considered an essential component of most mu-
seums’ missions and will be among the primary reasons why a mu-
seum is considering the acquisition of an object for its collec-
tions.”154 For private museums with the designated purpose of ex-
hibiting the donor’s collection, the foundation determines how 
much access to provide to the public.155 In some instances, a private 
museum interprets the tax-exempt purpose to exhibit as an inhe-
rent duty to safeguard and preserve the museums’ physical assets 
(such as the collection itself), rather than merely providing access 
to the general public.156 For example, a private operating founda-
tion may adopt “a traveling-collection approach, making the foun-
dation’s artwork available to museums on loan,”157 and still qualify 
as a tax-exempt organization. The underlying justification for tax 
exemption is undermined if the organization uses its charitable de-
ductions in a manner inconsistent with its overall charitable pur-
poses.158 Consequently, a private operating foundation that exclu-
sively lends artworks may fall short of the organizational test if its 
collection is inaccessible to the general public, except when on loan 
to other 501(c)(3) organizations.159 
                                                                                                                            
153 See generally § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(2)(i). The regulation provides an example: 
[Consider] S, a [tax-]exempt organization described in section 
501(c)(3), [which] maintains a large library of manuscripts and other 
historical reference material relating to the history and development 
of the region in which the collection is located. S makes a limited 
number of annual grants to enable post-doctoral scholars and doctoral 
candidates to use its library. Sometimes S obtains the right to publish 
the scholar’s work, although this is not a prerequisite to the receipt of 
a grant. The primary criterion for selection of grant recipients is the 
usefulness of the library’s resources to the applicant’s field of study. 
Under these circumstances, the grants made by S constitute 
qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of S’s 
exempt activities. 
§ 53.4942(b)-1(d), Ex. (7) (emphasis added). 
154 Gilboe, supra note 23. 
155 See Horwood, supra note 68, at 28. 
156 Gordon H. Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit Organizations: An Appropriate Standard 
of Conduct for Trustees and Directors of Museums and Other Cultural Institutions, 85 DICK. 
L. REV. 607, 610–11 (1981). 
157 Horwood, supra note 68, at 27. 
158 See Fricke, supra note 77, at 1161. 
159 But cf. supra note 150. 
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Private operating foundations perform an inimitable charitable 
function that is not serviced by other tax-exempt organizations.160 
These idiosyncratic institutions typically appeal to collectors of 
more avant-gardes artworks—founders have a greater degree of 
aesthetic control over the development of the museum’s holdings, 
and as a cultural organization.161 Private museums generally abide 
by the founder’s vision, except when the donor’s intent is so rigid 
that it hinders the museum’s long-term growth, or undercuts the 
public benefit.162 Consider the Barnes Foundation, which is one of 
the earliest private foundations in the United States.163 Throughout 
the early twentieth century, business tycoon Albert C. Barnes as-
sembled one of the most remarkable collections of post-
Impressionist and modern paintings in the world, which is “worth 
between twenty to thirty billion dollars” today.164 The Barnes 
Foundation has over 2,500 masterworks by artists including Paul 
Cézanne, Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Edgar Degas, Amedeo Modiglia-
ni, Vincent van Gogh, and Georges Seurat.165 Notwithstanding the 
Barnes Foundation’s status as one of the world’s finest private mu-
seums, there was a time (early in his tenure of collecting) when 
Barnes’ collection was predominantly unappreciated by the art 
world cognoscenti, and was often mocked by prominent Philadel-
phia arts institutions.166 Driven largely by his passion for collect-
ing—and to some degree his resentment of the cultural elite—
Barnes erected his own private art museum in a mansion in Lower 
Merion, Pennsylvania, just outside of Philadelphia.167 Barnes 
created the foundation to house his internationally renowned art 
                                                                                                                            
160 Kino, supra note 48. 
161 Id. 
162 Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
163 Crawford, supra note 45, at 42. 
164 James Panero, Outsmarting Albert Barnes, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (2011), 
http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/topic/donor_intent/outsmarting_albert_ 
barnes [https://perma.cc/Z2LA-SZ3X]. In comparison, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
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collection, and to develop educational programs to foster art ap-
preciation among students.168 
Barnes was a forward-thinking visionary, but placed tight re-
strictions on the museum that hindered the foundation’s existence 
as an independent organization.169 He exerted tight control over the 
museum’s operations and holdings, and meticulously curated the 
display of artworks himself.170 The museum first opened its doors 
in 1925 as an art school, but furnished few opportunities for the 
public to visit until after Barnes’ premature death in 1951.171 Barnes 
mandated that the collection stay in Lower Merion, and that the 
museum’s holdings never be sold or loaned to other arts institu-
tions.172 As a result, the Barnes Foundation was involved in a num-
ber of legal disputes that questioned whether its charitable activi-
ties provided a sufficient public benefit, in light of the limited pub-
lic access to the collection.173 Ultimately, the State Attorney Gen-
eral required the museum to remain open to the public two days a 
week, but allowed it to continue to operate by appointment only.174 
In subsequent litigation during the 1990s and 2000s, the courts dis-
regarded the donor’s original intent, and permitted the organiza-
tion to increase its hours of operation and charge admission fees in 
order to raise the necessary capital to maintain its operations.175 
After a controversial board takeover and ensuing litigation over the 
museum’s financial instability, the Barnes Foundation broke its 
independence and became affiliated with various Philadelphia-
based foundations.176 The museum’s holdings were eventually 
transferred to the Barnes Foundation’s new home in downtown 
Philadelphia, despite Barnes’ mandate that he did not want the col-
lection to change locations or merge with a public arts organiza-
tion.177 
                                                                                                                            
168 In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *12 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 
13, 2004). 
169 See id. at *13. 
170 Id.; accord D’Arcy, supra note 40. 
171 Panero, supra note 164. 
172 See Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *12–13; Panero, supra note 164. 
173 E.g., Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *12–13. 
174 Panero, supra note 164. 
175 See id.; see also Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *1. 
176 See Panero, supra note 164. 
177 See Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *19; see also Panero, supra note 164. 
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This case demonstrates how a private museum must balance 
the donor’s wishes with the organization’s tax-exempt purposes, 
which may necessitate a greater amount of public access.178 The 
museum’s relocation to Philadelphia enabled the Barnes Founda-
tion to provide greater public access, and safeguard Barnes’ trea-
sured collection for generations to come. Private museums “can 
become more firmly situated in the public realm” after the donor-
founder’s lifetime: Once artworks are donated to a private mu-
seum, they must remain in a tax-exempt organization.179 Ultimate-
ly, the artworks in the collection are of paramount importance to 
the public benefit, not the donor’s intent.180 
2.    Operational Test: “Substantial” Private Benefits Threaten 
Tax-Exempt Status 
Additionally, an organization must be “operated exclusively” 
in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes listed in section 
501(c)(3).181 The operational test considers the foundation’s “be-
havior and whether the organization seeking section 501(c)(3) sta-
tus operates in a way that meets the exempt purposes listed in the 
Code.”182 The organization must administer a significant enough 
public benefit to justify tax subsidies.183 The operational test broad-
ly “prohibit[s] a substantial nonexempt purpose . . . includ[ing] in-
urement, private benefit, and [any] operations that further non-
                                                                                                                            
178 See generally Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *1. 
179 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3; see also Barnes Found., 2004 
WL 2903655, at *19 (noting that there “were signals that Dr. Barnes expected the 
collection to have much greater public exposure after his death”); supra text 
accompanying note 142. 
180 See Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *19. 
181 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2017). Note that the IRS has interpreted 
“exclusively” to mean “primarily. Id. 
182 John, supra note 22, at 887 (citing Kosaras, supra note 142, at 129). “Although 
factors such as close control of the applicant, a proposed purchase from, financial 
transaction with, or management agreement with persons in control or related parties do 
not necessarily preclude exemption, they require adequate documentation and analysis to 
establish that the applicant operates for public rather than private purposes.” Megosh et 
al., supra note 119, at 136. A donor’s “close control . . . because of the potential for abuse, 
requires a clear demonstration that private interests will not be served.” Id. (citing 
Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 531 (1980), aff’d, 670 
F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
183 See infra text accompanying note 235. 
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profit goals outside the scope of section 501(c)(3).”184 Of the two 
prongs, the operational test is more difficult to examine when the 
private benefit is not financial or egregious.185 The IRS guidelines 
vaguely address the type of situations where a nonprofit organiza-
tion’s activities will threaten its tax-exempt status.186 A determina-
tion of whether or not the benefit is substantial is central to the pri-
vate benefit analysis.187 Organizations that partake in activities that 
create too great of a private benefit (or nonexempt activity) risk the 
revocation of their tax-exempt status and penalties, although a sin-
gle nonexempt activity can qualify for tax exemption if it relates to 
the organization’s tax-exempt purposes.188 In these situations, 
“[t]he outcome depends on the weight assigned to various indica-
tors of exempt versus nonexempt purpose[s].”189 
In addition to the public interests at stake, private museums of-
ten serve a “range of . . . special interests [that] reflect[] the scope 
of” the donor-founder’s vision.190 For example, consider the Glen-
stone museum in Potomac, Maryland, which has raised questions 
over the potential imbalance of private benefits.191 The museum’s 
founders, Mitchell and Emily Rales, gained substantial tax benefits 
from the foundation, where they serve as the President/Director 
and President.192 The Rales donated at least $450 million in stock 
                                                                                                                            
184 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 4036 (CG) (11–2005) 1, 6 (Jul. 12, 2011) (citing Better Bus. 
Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945)). 
185 For a discussion of the challenges in assessing private benefits that are not merely 
financial transactions, see supra Section III.A. 
186 Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 475, 478 (2012). 
187 Id. 
188 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2017). “Bad museums, moreover, harm good 
museums by hoarding resources and diminishing the public’s general respect for 
museums.” Catherine A. Karayan, Note, What Artworks May Come (To a Museum Near 
You): The State of Fractional Charitable Giving at the Intersection of Museology and Tax 
Policy, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J., 459, 474 (2011). 
189 Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues in IRC 501(C)(3), in EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM (1990), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc90.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WG8T-SJFV] [hereinafter Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues]. 
190 Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9. 
191 See generally Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
192 See Form 990, No. 20-5938416, pt. VIII, Attachment 12 (2014), http:// 
990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_archive/205/205938416/205938416_201412_990
PF.pdf?_ga=1.224798041.2120692051.1481836656 [https://perma.cc/Q7HY-6C4Q]. 
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to Glenstone from 2012 to 2014, without paying capital gains tax.193 
Meanwhile, the museum benefits from tax-free stock that may be 
used to purchase artworks, invest in its expansion project, and/or 
cover operational expenses.194 Despite the foundation’s entangle-
ment with private interests, Glenstone provides a number of public 
benefits that weigh in favor of tax exemption.195 The foundation has 
made a concerted effort to serve its educational purposes by invit-
ing children to view the contemporary art collection, which is va-
lued at nearly one billion dollars.196 Additionally, the Rales plan to 
construct a new building that will cost at least $125 million,197 and 
sought further “clarification from the IRS in 2012 to determine 
whether its expansion plan and land use were in accordance with 
the [Code].”198 Regardless of the IRS’ decision, the Rales are un-
likely to “let taxes deter them. The couple have enough money and 
ambition to carry through with their plans even if the IRS were to” 
revoke the foundation’s tax-exempt status.199 The lofty project 
aims to attract more visitors, provide greater public access to Glen-
stone’s art collection, and will likely eliminate any concern over 
private tax benefits.200 
C.   Qualitative and Quantitative Tests Fail to Define What Types of 
Private Benefits Cross the Threshold from Permissible Incidental 
Benefits to Impermissible Substantial Benefits 
Generally, the presence of a substantial private benefit will dis-
qualify an organization’s tax-exempt status.201 However, even sub-
stantial private benefits may be tolerated if they are considered 
qualitatively and quantitatively incidental in comparison with the 
                                                                                                                            
193 Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
194 Id. 
195 For further examination of the Glenstone Foundation and substantial private benefit 
analysis, see infra Section V.C. 
196 Shnayerson, supra note 42; see also Form 990, supra note 192, at pt. II, Attachment 9. 
197 Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
198 See Halperin, supra note 44. 
199 Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
200 See id.; see also discussion infra Section V.C. 
201 See Emily Chan, Private Benefit Rules – Part I: Private Benefit Doctrine, NONPROFIT L. 
BLOG (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/private-benefit-rules-part-i-
private-benefit-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/MAK9-USZG]. 
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organization’s charitable goals.202 Qualitatively incidental private 
benefits are “a mere byproduct of a public benefit,”203 whereas, 
quantitatively private benefits should be insubstantial in amount.204 
A qualitatively incidental “private benefit must not be substantial 
after considering the overall public benefit conferred by the activi-
ty.”205 According to the IRS, some private benefit is qualitatively 
permissible if “the benefits from the organization’s activities flow 
principally to the general public . . .  [and] [a]ny private benefits 
derived . . . do not lessen the public benefits flowing from the or-
ganization’s operations.”206 Furthermore, the IRS ruled that “it 
would be impossible for the organization to accomplish its purpos-
es without providing” some private benefit.207 
To illustrate this point, consider the Brant Foundation, which 
received much scrutiny from the Senate Finance Committee In-
quiry.208 Coupled with a number of concerns, including the lack of 
signage and the museum’s relatively remote location, the Brant 
Foundation may run into private benefit issues for recording visits 
from “fellow billionaire collectors” in the organization’s 2012 tax 
return as “among [its] charitable activities.”209 The Brant Founda-
tion does in fact provide public benefits such as “organiz[ing] trav-
eling exhibitions, sponsor[ing] lectures and host[ing] educational 
                                                                                                                            
202 Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues, supra note 189; see also Plumstead 
Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 675 F. 2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision by the Tax Court, holding that a 501(c)(3) arts 
organization’s participation in a partnership with for-profit partners would not disqualify 
its tax-exempt status merely because some investors profited from the production of a 
play. Id at 245. In this case, the private benefit was permissible because the investors 
participation was necessary for the organization to achieve its tax-exempt purpose. See 
Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324, 1330–34 (1980), aff’d, 675 F.2d 
244 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit also found particularly relevant the fact that (1) 
the investors were “not shareholders in or officers or directors of” the organization; and 
(2) the agreement gave “full management” control over the operations to the 
organization, and not the investors. Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, 675 F.2d at 245; accord Chan, 
supra note 201. 
203 Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137. 
204 Chan, supra note 201. 
205 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
206 Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137 (citing Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128). 
207 Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128). 
208 See infra text accompanying note 250. 
209 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
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workshops for children;”210 however, “[t]he identification of the 
art museum audience as an educational elite conflicts directly with 
the idea that museums provide a broad public benefit.”211 These 
incidental benefits are permissible so long as the organization’s tax-
exempt activities benefit a broad enough charitable class.212 If exhi-
bition and access are the primary charitable purpose, then the col-
lection should be accessible to the general public, rather than serve 
a narrow class of wealthy beneficiaries.213 
A private benefit is quantitatively incidental if it is “a necessary 
concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, i.e., 
the activity can be accomplished only by benefiting certain private 
individuals.”214 The inquiry considers the private benefit in rela-
tion “to the public benefit of the specific activity in question, not 
the public benefit provided by all [of] the organization’s activi-
ties.”215 Even if the private benefit is substantial enough to ques-
tion the organization’s tax-exempt status, it may be “unquantifia-
ble . . . such as an advantage when dealing with the public.”216 The 
more quantifiable the private benefit is, the greater the likelihood 
that the activity is non-incidental.217 The presence of a private ben-
efit is more likely when an organization deals primarily with a “sin-
gle entity (or group of related entities), or . . .  the group receiving 
the benefit is small.”218 
To determine whether a private benefit is either quantitatively 
permissible (i.e., incidental), or crosses the threshold to be consi-
dered substantial enough to undermine the organization’s tax-
exempt status, consider the following two examples. A private art 
museum may be organized for the educational purpose of promot-
                                                                                                                            
210 Id. 
211 SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 7. 
212 See Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, supra note 115, at 1069. 
213 See Hubbard, supra note 25, at 29. Sam Keller, Director of the Fondation Beyeler, 
stated: “[A]rt is universal and for everybody . . . . However, our society has done a lot to 
make people insecure and not enough to educate them about it. Everyone can have an 
emotional experience and gain intellectual inspiration from a great work of art.” Id. at 29–
30. 
214 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
215 Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137. 
216 Molk, supra note 186, at 487. 
217 Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137. 
218 Id. 
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ing the arts, and exhibiting artworks by a group of lesser-known but 
accomplished local artists, yet still fall short of the operational test 
if it primarily serves private interests.219 In the first scenario, a mu-
seum that provides a platform for artists to sell artwork and earn a 
significant portion of the profits, cannot qualify for tax exemption, 
despite its overall charitable purposes to provide support for local 
artists and ensure community engagement with the visual arts.220 
For example, if the artists earn ninety percent and the museum 
keeps ten percent to cover its operating costs, the “principal activi-
ty . . . serves the private interests of these artists.”221 This kind of 
arrangement is impermissible when the museum’s conduct pro-
vides direct private benefits that are non-incidental, and therefore, 
cannot be deemed as secondary to the organization’s tax-exempt 
purposes.222 
In the second example, a private museum that conducts activi-
ties similar to those mentioned above may sell art and still qualify 
for exemption, only if its primary activity is related to its declared 
charitable purpose. In Goldsboro Art League, Inc., v. Commissioner, a 
museum sold and exhibited art by local artists who earned eighty 
percent of the profits, and retained twenty percent of the proceeds 
to cover its operating expenses.223 The Tax Court ruled that the 
museum was operated exclusively as an educational organization 
under section 501(c)(3),224 in part, because its primary activity was 
managing its art collection and promoting arts education to the 
general public.225 This type of private benefit is lawful, so long as 
the organization is not primarily dedicated to “a substantial com-
mercial purpose.”226 The Tax Court identified several key factors 
that support tax exemption, including the museum’s mission to 
display “artist’s more daring works in a part of the country where 
                                                                                                                            
219 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii), Ex. (2) (2017). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 See id. 
223 See 75 T.C. 337, 340–41 (1980). 
224 Id. at 344–46. 
225 Id. at 344 (determining that the organization satisfied the public benefit requirement, 
in part, because “the overwhelming purpose of petitioner’s art classes, films, museum 
tours, and display of its permanent collection is charitable”). 
226 Id. at 342. 
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there are no nearby art museums or galleries,” the organization’s 
“dedication to teach the public, through a variety of means, to ap-
preciate art,” and the fact that the artists who received the private 
benefits were not in control.227 An activity that confers a substantial 
private benefit is permissible if: (1) it is “secondary and inciden-
tal,” and (2) furthers the organization’s primary tax-exempt pur-
poses.228 
D.   Hatch Review Identifies Key Areas in the Tax Code Susceptible to 
Donor-Founder Abuse 
The lack of clarity as to what qualifies as a non-incidental pri-
vate benefit has raised concern among private collectors who must 
comply with these requirements.229 For the most part, these types 
of private benefits are qualitatively incidental, so long as they stem 
from a greater public benefit.230 However, the rules are less clear 
when assessing whether these benefits are quantitatively incidental, 
or how the substantial benefits tests should be applied to private art 
museums.231 Many private benefits conferred on donors and 
founders of private museums are not directly quantifiable, despite 
their close ties to a single entity or individual.232 
The current tax regime creates an imbalance in favor of wealthy 
individuals, and necessitates further review into how Congress can 
best address this unfairness in the Code.233 In May 2016, the U.S. 
Senate Finance Committee concluded its investigation into several 
private art museums to ensure that they satisfy the public benefit 
requirements under section 501(c)(3).234 The Inquiry considered 
several key elements to determine whether these private operating 
foundations confer substantial enough benefits to undermine the 
organization’s tax-exempt charitable purposes, including: the level 
of control the founder has over the museum’s assets and gover-
nance structure, the proximity of the location to the founder’s 
                                                                                                                            
227 Id. at 344–45. 
228 Id. at 345. 
229 See supra text accompanying note 205. 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 204–07. 
231 See discussion supra Section III.C. 
232 See supra text accompanying note 216. 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 126–32. 
234 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
904         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:869 
 
home, and the amount of public access to the museum’s facili-
ties.235 Senator Hatch admonished organizations that benefit their 
donor-founder at the expense of their charitable purpose.236 
Though none of the factors alone justify the revocation of an organ-
ization’s tax-exempt status, these may be informative when eva-
luating whether these private museums satisfy the qualitative and 
quantitative tests.237 
1.    Degree of Closeness to the Donor-Founder May Indicate 
Excessive Entanglement 
One of the most significant factors is the source of the artworks 
in the collection.238 The Code is structured to incentivize these 
high-net-worth individuals to create privately funded operating 
foundations,239 and grants charitable tax deductions for artworks 
donated to private art museums created and controlled by the indi-
vidual donor-founder.240 In practice, private operating foundations 
only separate the legal ownership of a donated artwork from the 
donor.241 Given the tax law’s failure to clearly establish the amount 
of donor control that renders a private museum ineligible for tax 
exemption, there is growing concern that some collectors will take 
advantage of these legal loopholes.242 Of those surveyed, “[s]everal 
museums indicated that donors who had provided more than five 
percent of the collection . . . oversee [their] operations, often by 
serving as” a board member or “as President of the mu-
                                                                                                                            
235 E.g., Press Release, supra note 14. 
236 Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
237 See id. 
238 Id. 
239 See I.R.C. § 4940(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
240 Rodgers, supra note 126, at 46. “For those collectors who would like to partake in . . . 
charitable giving . . . , but are reluctant to cede over control over their collections to a 
wholly unrelated museum, the idea of establishing their own museum, with curators of 
their choosing might be a welcome one . . . . The challenge for such an arrangement is in 
determining when a donor’s control over a museum renders the museum ineligible for 
tax-exempt status.” Jason Kleinman & Michelle Bergeron Spell, Tax Benefits and 
Challenges of Private Museums, 20 ART & ADVOCACY, Summer 2015, at 4, http:// 
www.herrick.greatjakes.com/content/uploads/2016/03/Art-Advocacy-Summer-2015-
Volume-20-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K6Z-VLZW]. 
241 Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63. 
242 See supra text accompanying note 236. 
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seum . . . .”243 Additionally, there is ambiguity around donor 
access, and whether access to the museum after-hours is imper-
missible.244 Ultimately, Senator Hatch seemed distrustful of these 
type of relationships and cautioned against too much donor in-
volvement.245 
2.    Congress Is Wary of Private Museums Situated Near a 
Donor-Founder’s Residence 
Another important factor is the location of the museum in rela-
tion to the donor’s property. The IRS has previously determined 
that donors cannot deduct artworks situated in their private resi-
dence that are not primarily designated for public display.246 For 
example, the IRS revoked federal tax exemption for a public exhibi-
tion space located in the backyard of taxpayer’s private residence 
near the swimming pool.247 An organization’s tax-exempt status 
may also be in jeopardy if the foundation is in an inconvenient loca-
tion that limits public access, and is a short walk from the donor’s 
private residence.248 Senator Hatch specifically raised issue with 
the Brant Foundation Art Study Center in Greenwich, Connecti-
cut, which “is just down the road from the . . . estate of its creator, 
Peter M. Brant, the newsprint magnate and avid art collector.”249 
There are no signs identifying the building, and the Center is lo-
cated on an unmarked street, “though the location is known to the 
                                                                                                                            
243 Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
244 Id. (“Several museums indicated that their directors, trustees, and donors have 
physical access to the museum outside of normal operating hours. Some of these 
personnel . . . [are] donors who provided a substantial portion of the museum’s collection, 
or in some cases, established the museum. These museums uniformly asserted that such 
access was solely for purposes related to the museums’ operations (such as changing 
exhibits, office work, etc.) and not for personal purposes.”). 
245 See id. 
246 See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-24-001 (Nov. 5, 1987). 
247 Id. “The fact that no effort was made to advise the general public of the availability 
of the garden through publicity or signs on the premises, despite the fact that most people 
would be reluctant to enter private property, let alone wander around a private house and 
pool, indicates an attempt to control and limit the size and timing of groups visiting the 
property.” Id. (noting that visits by a few groups affiliated with a museum or school were 
not enough to justify the tax exemption). 
248 For discussion of the amount of access private operating foundations should provide 
to satisfy the public benefit requirement, see generally supra Section III.B. 
249 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
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art-world cognoscenti and celebrities who attend the twice-a-year 
gala openings . . . .”250 There is also concern over whether the 
Code should encourage donor-founders to develop art museums in 
urban rather than rural communities. Many of the museums sur-
veyed, including the Brant Foundation, were located outside of ma-
jor cities, which is fairly common practice within the private mu-
seum sector.251 Art museums have played a major role in the eco-
nomic diversification of their local communities, especially in 
smaller cities where they play a large role in local economic devel-
opment252 due to their ability to attract a large number of visitors—
both foreign and domestic—and increase local tourism.253 While 
museums can have a tremendous impact on urban renewal and ru-
ral development efforts, “not all cultural institutions have fared as 
well.”254 In some cases, private museums have failed to realize 
their potential as “economic drivers.”255 
3.    Limited Public Access Warrants Further Investigation into 
Whether These Private Museums Fall Short of the Public 
Benefit Requirement 
Additionally, the Inquiry examined the amount of access—or 
lack thereof—that these private operating foundations provide to 
the public.256 Private operating foundations are not expressly re-
quired to be open to the public to qualify as a tax-exempt organiza-
tion under section 501(c)(3).257 On the other hand, private mu-
seums that do not actually exhibit art themselves, and only lend 
artworks, may be at odds with their tax-exempt purpose.258 In this 
instance, the private benefit of favorable tax treatment to the donor 
                                                                                                                            
250 Id. 
251 See id.; see also Press Release, supra note 14. 
252 Beatriz Plaza et al., Culture-Led City Brands as Economic Engines: Theory and Empirics, 
54 ANNALS REGIONAL SCI. 179, 181–82 (2015). 
253 See id. at 190. 
254 Id. at 182 n.2. 
255 Id. For example, both the Milwaukee Art Museum and the Los Angeles Museum of 
Contemporary Art fell short of their attendance number projections. Id. 
256 Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
257 See supra Section II.B (discussing the rules governing private operating foundations). 
258 Cf. discussion infra Section IV.B.1. But see supra note 150 (describing examples of 
private museums that meet the public benefit requirement by lending their private 
collection to other arts institutions for display). 
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may outweigh the greater public benefit and justify the revocation 
of the organization’s tax-exempt status;259 whereas a lending pro-
gram that supplements the display of a private collection is likely to 
support tax-exemption so long as the public benefit outweighs any 
private interests  at stake.260 
Senator Hatch also expressed some misgivings about organiza-
tions with infrequent hours of operation.261 Senator Hatch consi-
dered limited hours of operation problematic, noting that the “total 
number of hours open each week ranged from 20 to 48 hours” in a 
fifty-two-week year.262 Quite a few museums have highly irregular 
schedules (e.g., opening for a total of twenty-five hours per week, 
closing for new projects and construction, or closing for weeks or 
months at a time to install new exhibits).263 Moreover, the Com-
mittee seemed to take issue with museums that require visitors to 
schedule reservations in advance.264 However, it is fairly common 
practice for museums to rely on a reservation system, either exclu-
                                                                                                                            
259 See supra text accompanying notes 150–58. 
260 See generally Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12 
(considering whether any of the museums created “robust loan programs that make their 
art available in museums worldwide”). A number of the museums surveyed participate in 
partnerships with other arts institutions to display artwork to better serve their overall 
mission. Id. For example, the Hall Art Foundation provides extensive information online 
regarding its loan program and images from its permanent collection. See Collection, HALL 
ART FOUND., http://www.hallartfoundation.org/collection [https://perma.cc/5YWK-
3JSZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017); Loan Program, HALL ART FOUND., 
http://www.hallartfoundation.org/loan-program/artists/a-g [https://perma.cc/2UYH-
3MUL] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017); see also infra note 263 and accompanying text 
(providing more information on the private foundation’s admission policies). 
261 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
262 Id. The Linda Pace Foundation in San Antonio, Texas, was found to only be open for 
twenty hours per week, along with four other museums. Id.; see also Claire Voon, Tax Law 
Too Lax? IRS Receives Results of Private Museum Investigation, HYPERALLERGIC (June 2, 
2016), http://hyperallergic.com/303139/tax-law-too-lax-irs-receives-results-of-private-
museum-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/8RBE-DYS2]. 
263 Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. Notably, the Hall Art 
Foundation, a private operating foundation in Vermont, is considered “the least 
welcoming for a spontaneous museum trip.” Voon, supra note 262. The Hall Foundation 
is open seasonally from May to November, on weekends and Wednesdays, and only offers 
appointments at 11 AM, 1 PM, and 3 PM. About, Section of Vermont, Subsection of 
Locations, HALL ART FOUND., http://www.hallartfoundation.org/location/vermont 
[https://perma.cc/3TFC-RZJ5] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
264 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
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sively or extensively.265 Some require reservations weeks or even 
months in advance due to high demand.266 One of the museums 
surveyed explained, “[t]he reservation system is offered both as a 
convenience to visitors and as a means of managing visitor flow to 
offer an opportunity for a contemplative visit where each guest can 
connect directly with the art.”267 Other considerations include the 
number of visitors, the cost of admission, and alternative methods 
of public access to the collection.268 The Committee looked favora-
bly upon museums that have steadily increased their number of vis-
itors, and condoned others for their exceptionally low attendance 
records.269 Nearly all of the museums surveyed offer free admis-
sion, though Hatch acknowledged that institutional constraints 
may prevent some private museums from offering free entry.270 
IV.   PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
“The philanthropist puts art into the public pur-
view, teaches, refines, and improves socie-
ty . . . . [P]hilanthropy [is] a [powerful] branding 
tool, conferring image, taste, and social responsibili-
ty . . . . [The donor’s] ‘brand’ is defined and sup-
plemented by adding their personal cultural assets 
to the public domain . . . the collector has deemed 
worth of his/her collection.”271 
The results of Senator Hatch’s investigation highlight the need 
to “[rein] in the out-of-control accumulation of wealth by the larg-
est nonprofits yet keep in place all of the benefits enjoyed by those 
nonprofits that use their funds diligently for the betterment of so-
ciety.”272 Private museums are invaluable charitable organiza-




268 See id. 
269 Id. “[T]he average number of visitors for the past five years was 5,700 or less, and 
some of the larger institutions welcome nearly half a million visitors annually.” Id.; see 
also discussion infra Section V.C; cf. discussion supra Section III.B.2. 
270 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
271 Weaver, supra note 2. 
272 Fricke, supra note 77, at 1162. 
2017] BILLIONAIRE’S TREASURE TROVE 909 
 
tions—they afford meaningful contributions in service of the public 
benefit that cannot be provided by other arts institutions.273  Col-
lectors are worried that the Senate Inquiry will have a “chilling ef-
fect” on donors considering setting up their own private museums, 
or that it will lead to tighter restrictions that will prevent private art 
foundations from qualifying for tax-exempt status.274 On the other 
hand, those in the art world who support the Committee review 
share a more altruistic view of charitable deductions: These indi-
viduals believe donors should abide by the rules, and that “the 
scrutiny will simply weed out the bad apples.”275 This Part further 
examines the types of private benefits provided to donor founders, 
in order to determine their potential impact on the art world, and 
the increased risk—if any—that these foundations and their donors 
will be the subject of intense scrutiny. Section IV.A contends that 
the Code should continue to incentivize participation by high-net-
worth individuals in the private art museum sector. Section IV.B 
asserts that, while there should be some level of reform, the IRS 
should not set aside the current tax exemption structure altogether. 
This Section demonstrates that private benefit should still be as-
sessed on a case-by-case analysis, and proposes new guidelines to 
help these private museums comply with the public benefit limita-
tions. 
A.   Tax Incentives Encourage Wealthy Individuals to Participate in the 
Private Museum Sector 
One proposal to curb donor abuse is to limit charitable deduc-
tions to a lower percentage for private operating foundations with 
the donor-founder in control.276 However, this approach may re-
move some of the major incentives that led wealthy art patrons to 
create these museums in the first place. The current tax regime en-
courages billionaires to spend more money on art, and the private 
                                                                                                                            
273 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
274 See Halperin, supra note 44. 
275 Id.; see also Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3 (“Howard 
Rachofsky and Vernon Faulconer, two Dallas collectors, and Rosa and Carlos de la Cruz, 
who is chairman of the CC1 Companies, in Miami, have opened small museums with 
limited hours and access, but neither gallery space is registered as a foundation or 
charity.”). 
276 Rodgers, supra note 126, at 66. 
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museums spaces in which it is displayed, than they ordinarily 
would as individual collectors.277 Alternatively, limiting deductions 
may not have a significant deterrent effect—the wealthiest individ-
uals will continue to build private collections regardless of the limi-
tations on charitable deductions.278 The cost of establishing a pri-
vate museum “is rarely offset in full by tax breaks. But those breaks 
do help.”279 Despite these issues, many individuals in the art world 
would keep the current tax subsidy structure for the sake of the 
overall benefits to the charitable sector.280 According to Jeffrey 
Deitch, the former Director of the Museum of Contemporary Art 
in Los Angeles, California, “[p]rivate museums are a ‘part of our 
American art culture,’ [and] . . . their recent burst of growth [is] 
‘one of the most exciting developments in the international art 
world.’”281 
Any changes in the Code should avoid “unintended incentives, 
such as when the development of fractional giving fostered what 
Congress thought of as unfair tax practices.”282 Fractional charita-
ble giving is a tax savings strategy that “allows a donor to make a 
series of partial donations over an extended period of time . . . [and] 
is a particularly useful tool for donors who” desire a charitable de-
duction, but “do not wish to completely part with the donated 
                                                                                                                            
277 Shnayerson, supra note 42. There has been a fundamental shift in the way that high 
net-worth individuals collect: The “widespread belief that art” is one of the most stable 
and valuable assets has attracted many new art patrons, who regard art as an investment 
over its aesthetic value. See THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 230–32, 35; see also Susan E. 
Wagner, Note, The Implications of Changing the Current Law on Charitable Deductions—
Maintaining Incentives for Donating Art to Museums, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 773, 775 (1986). 
“[T]he contemporary art market has become a competitive high stakes-game, fueled by 
great amounts of money and ego.” THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 228. The market is 
driven by the behavior of these billionaire “supercollectors, whose fortunes originated in 
finance and hedge funds.” Id. at 232. 
278 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
279 Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
280 See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. Maryse Brand, Director 
of the Hall Art Foundation, noted that these private museums “all have a common goal of 
making artwork available for the enjoyment and education of the public,” which “far 
outweigh[s] any benefits received from tax exemptions.” Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Sean Conley, Paint a New Picture: The Artist-Museum Partnership Act and the Opening 
of New Markets for Charitable Giving, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 89, 107 
(2009). 
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[artwork].”283 A collector could gift only “a fraction of [the] full 
interest in a work of art to a museum” and in exchange, could de-
duct an amount equal to the full value of the art multiplied by the 
portion donated.284 Donors could dodge capital gains taxes on high-
ly appreciated works of art.285 Collectors often held onto their art-
works for decades before transferring full ownership to a museum, 
and were incentivized to delay giving over a longer time period due 
to the appreciation in value.286 Congress also expressed concern 
over museums’ close business ties with trustees and their related 
companies—a sentiment that is still expressed today among those 
who have called for a closer examination of tax incentives for high-
income individuals in the private museum sector.287 
In response, Congress enacted the Pension Protection Act of 
2006, which effectively eliminated this loophole.288 The Act im-
posed two affirmative requirements: (1) the donor must donate the 
entire property interest within ten years from the initial fractional 
contribution date, or the death of the donor, whichever is the earli-
                                                                                                                            
283 Karayan, supra note 188, at 460 (“[Fractional charitable giving] would, for example, 
allow a donor to give [ten percent] of a piece of art to a museum each year over ten 
years.”). See generally supra Section II.B (discussing charitable deductions for private 
operating foundations); supra Section III.A (discussing private benefits unique to these 
type of tax-exempt organizations). 
284 Alicia C. Beyer, Note, Gone but Not Forgotten: The End of Fractional Giving and the 
Search for Alternatives, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 459, 460 (2013). In these instances, the 
donor only transfers a fractional interest of the artwork, and the museum is only “entitled 
to use and display the work for the amount of time corresponding to its fraction of 
ownership.” Id. A contribution would be calculated “[a]t the time of the initial 
donation[,]” and is equal to “the percentage interest in the work donated multiplied by 
the total value of the work.” Id. at 462. 
285 Wieczorek, supra note 91, at 99. Before Congress put an end to fractional giving in 
2006, “some of the country’s largest and most prestigious museums relied very heavily 
on fractional giving as a source of donations.” Beyer, supra note 284, at 461. “The San 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art (SFMoMA), which received the most fractional 
donations of any art museum, has more than eight hundred works in its permanent 
collection that started as fractional gifts.” Id.; see also Rachel Emma Silverman, Joint 
Custody for Your Monet, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB112060578625677881 [https://perma.cc/BN3T-ZUVX]. 
286 Stephanie Strom, The Man Museums Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/10/arts/design/10stro.html?pagewanted=all 
[https://perma.cc/VJ2Y-TFEG]. 
287 Id.; see also Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
288 Wieczorek, supra note 91, at 91. 
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est (“the gifting period”);289 and (2) transfer substantial physical 
possession of such property sometime during the gifting period, or 
the organization must use the property in a manner related to its 
tax-exempt purpose.290 Congress often responds to these “per-
verse incentives” by eliminating them altogether, “rather than 
dealing directly with the offending action.”291 As a result, changes 
in the Code are not always as effective of a deterrent as Congress 
originally intended.292 For instance, in the absence of fractional giv-
ing, wealthy donors began to form private operating foundations, 
the closest alternative that would allow donors to have some degree 
of control over their art collections, while still receiving tax 
breaks.293 Taxpayers that tend to skirt tax laws will alter their eco-
nomic behavior in response to any alterations in the tax regime.294 
To prevent the creation of similar inequities in the Code, any 
changes should “be aimed at those who essentially write-off their 
own collections while keeping tight control and limiting the pub-
lic’s access.”295 
B.   Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath Water! 
If updated, the Code ought to reflect the public trust vested in 
donors, and their organizations, to fulfill their charitable pur-
pose.296 Tax-exempt organizations “principal responsibility . . . is 
to strengthen that trust and to restore it if it is impaired by their 
policies, decisions, actions, omissions, or under their supervi-
sion.”297 The aim should be to provide the nonprofit private mu-
seum sector with a certain degree of autonomy to ensure its surviv-
al.298 The current regime for tax-exemption “indicates that Con-
                                                                                                                            
289 Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1218 (a)(3)(A)(i)(I)–(II), I.R.C. § 170(o)(3)(A) 
(2012). 
290 See, e.g., Pension Protection Act § 1218 (a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)–(II). 
291 Conley, supra note 282, at 107. 
292 See id. at 107–08. 
293 See id. at 107. 
294 Id. 
295 Rodgers, supra note 126, at 61. 
296 See Bryce, supra note 29, at 128. 
297 Id. at 128–29. 
298 Fricke, supra note 77, at 1166 (explaining that “an effective solution . . . must be 
narrowly tailored to address the issue[,] . . . should respect the autonomy of all 
organizations[,] . . . [and] must actually address the problem”). 
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gress did not intend to exert much control over charitable organiza-
tions, since a deduction-based subsidy fosters the private control of 
charitable organizations.”299 
Reform should also ensure that any artworks placed into these 
section 501(c)(3) organizations “see [their] way into the public 
realm.”300 For example, the Noguchi Museum in Long Island City, 
Queens, New York, was established by the “internationally re-
nowned, Japanese-American artist Isamu Noguchi,” to house some 
of his most representative artworks.301 Since its inception in 1985, 
the Museum was a program of the artists’ private operating foun-
dation, and helped “pioneer . . . the metamorphosis of the Long 
Island City area into the arts district it is today.”302 After twenty 
years, the Museum eventually consolidated with the Noguchi 
Foundation, and received public charity status in 2005.303 With 
enough time, successful private art museums, such as the Noguchi 
Museum and the Barnes Foundation, eventually turn into public 
charities, or develop into fully functional private arts institu-
tions.304 
Modification of the Code affects some organizations more than 
others, especially tax-exempt organizations that receive support by 
high-income individuals such as arts groups and educational insti-
tutions.305 These institutions rely heavily on the generosity of these 
individuals, hence more stringent regulations are not in the public 
                                                                                                                            
299 Sugin, supra note 64, at 2615. Congress clearly distinguished private operating 
foundations from public charities when it enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and 
created more stringent rules for these institutions. Fricke, supra note 77, at 1138–39 
(citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 496–98). Notably, there 
has not been any significant action since passing the Act. Id. “For the past forty-six years, 
the tax code as it pertains to nonprofits has been remarkably static.” Id. 
300 Rodgers, supra note 126, at 57. 
301 History, NOGUCHI MUSEUM, http://www.noguchi.org/museum/history [https:// 
perma.cc/G2Z6-M59U] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 See discussion supra Section III.B.1. 
305 See NAT’L ASSEMBLY OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, supra note 125, at 4. 
“Undoubtedly, constituents of a group that has enjoyed a benefit for over 100 years will 
be highly resistant to any change in that benefit that could be construed as a lessening of 
the subsidy provided to them.” Fricke, supra note 77, at 1177. 
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interest.306 Any new rules should be narrowly tailored to prevent 
individuals from receiving substantial private benefits from charit-
able deductions.307 Reform should avoid adversely affecting organi-
zations that provide publicly accessible educational programs and 
benefits.308 It is unrealistic to expect that wealthy donors will act on 
purely philanthropic motives: Collectors may partake in charitable 
giving to further their own self-interests, yet still contribute mea-
ningful public benefits.309 For one, the act of cultivating a museum-
quality private art collection is inextricably connected with the col-
lector’s ego.310 It is human nature to desire recognition, and 
“[v]anity can be as strong a motivation as generosity.”311 Wealthy 
art collectors usually expect for their art to be viewed by their peers 
and the general public.312 According to Allan Schwartzman, an art 
adviser for the Rachofsky House in Dallas, Texas, “[a]rt collecting 
becomes an expression of self.”313 Or as Marc Glimcher, President 
of New York gallery PaceWildenstein, explained: “[It is] the 
world’s most expensive MySpace.”314 
                                                                                                                            
306 Marsh, supra note 156, at 623; see also Mary Varson Cromer, Note, Don’t Give Me 
That!: Tax Valuation of Gifts to Art Museums, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 777, 792 n.115 
(2006) (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587). “Given that the 
primary purpose of these provisions is to benefit charity, any benefit to the taxpayer is 
[essentially] secondary and merely for the purpose of providing incentive to the taxpayer 
to assist with the greater goal of benefiting charities. Id. at 793. 
307 Rodgers, supra note 126, at 61. 
308 Id. “In many of these instances where a small percentage of individuals are abusing 
an otherwise successful system, the argument is that any new legislation would be ‘an 
overreaction to a limited problem.’” Id. (citing Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable 
Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 
1079 (2003)). 
309 Goldstein, supra note 54. Peter Brant, founder of the Brant Foundation, stated: 
[S]omebody can come in because they are commercially interested 
and think they can make a good living professionally off of art or just 
make a quick dollar and everybody hates that, but I don’t hate it 
because those people can turn out to be the biggest collectors in the 
future, and those people can turn out to be the biggest sponsors of 
museum shows in the future. 
Id. 
310 Kino, supra note 48. 
311 D’Arcy, supra note 40. 
312 Kino, supra note 48. 
313 Id. 
314 Id. 
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Collectors assert that the public benefits outweigh any private 
benefits, even in the case of the smaller museums with fewer num-
bers of visitors.315 The tax system must still incentivize charitable 
giving, which, in some part, will always benefit collectors despite 
the organization’s overall charitable purposes.316 However, the tax 
law should not effectuate the private whims of these high-net-
worth donors, if they contravene these idiosyncratic museums’ 
ability to transition into fully functional institutions.317 Museums 
can exist in perpetuity, therefore, the Code should not foreclose on 
future donors because “it all trickles down to build a much higher 
form of culture.”318 In all, it is more beneficial to grant these pri-
vate museums tax-exemption because of the potential loss of im-
portant donors and supporters that museums tend to rely on the 
most.319 
1.    Any New IRS Guidelines Should Prevent Exploitation of 
the Tax Regime 
Rather than create an entirely separate tax regime to govern 
private operating foundations, the IRS should keep the current tax 
system in place, and issue new Treasury regulations or guidelines 
to ensure compliance with the public benefit requirement. Tax 
reform that revokes exemptions for museums undermines “the na-
tional promotion of educational programming in the humanities 
and the protection of priceless collections.”320 Proposals to remove 
or significantly limit charitable deductions adopt a short-sighted 
view of the pedagogical role of private museums, and may thwart 
their ability to become influential cultural institutions. The Code 
should still incentivize private creation within the nonprofit arts 
industry because it is more beneficial to allow these organizations 
                                                                                                                            
315 See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 




317 See generally supra Section III.B.1 (discussing the Barnes Foundation, and the 
circumstances in which the courts may disregard the founder’s original intent to uphold 
the organization’s charitable purposes above all else). 
318 Goldstein, supra note 54 (quoting Peter Brant, founder of the Brant Foundation). 
319 See generally Marsh, supra note 156, at 623–24. 
320 John, supra note 22, at 892 (citing Burch, supra note 113, at 306). 
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to continue to operate independently. The IRS should avoid creat-
ing over-prescriptive rules that would hinder the success of these 
organizations.321 The private benefit analysis should be judged 
based on the totality of the circumstances. Any new regulations 
should give donors credit for investing in the private art museum 
sector, and allow them to write off expenses related to the mu-
seum’s maintenance and operations, so long as these tax breaks 
benefit the general public.322 
Public benefit is of paramount importance: a museum’s gover-
nance, maintenance of its collection, and programmatic efforts 
must all abide by the organization’s mission to serve the public and 
educate society “by advancing understanding and appreciation of” 
art.323 Donor-founders and those managing the museum’s opera-
tions “must do more than avoid legal liability, they must take af-
firmative steps to maintain their integrity” and act ethically to jus-
tify their tax-exempt status.324 Private museums must act in fur-
therance of their declared charitable purposes to warrant tax ex-
emption.325 Therefore, the Code should encourage private mu-
seums to do more to ensure public engagement beyond a narrow 
subset of their own community.326 At a bare minimum, private mu-
seums ought to be open to the public.327 Private arts institutions 
that merely lend artworks to other 501(c)(3) organizations without 
actually displaying their own collection should not qualify for tax-
exempt status as a private operating foundation.328 The current tax 
regime allows these type of organizations to receive greater charit-
able deductions without contributing any tangible public bene-
fits.329 Donors should not be entitled to more favorable tax treat-
                                                                                                                            
321 For historical background on fractional giving, see generally supra Section IV.A. 
322 See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
323 Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9. 
324 Id. 
325 Bryce, supra note 29, at 114. 
326 SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 6. 
327 Eligibility Criteria, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS (Jan. 1, 2005) http://www.aam-us.org/ 
resources/assessment-programs/accreditation/eligibility [https://perma.cc/QBD2-
43PT]. 
328 See generally supra Section III.B (discussing the requirements for private operating 
foundations that satisfy the public benefit organizational and operational requirements for 
tax-exempt status, despite the lack of public access to their art collection). 
329 See supra Part III. 
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ment for simply creating a separate entity as a conduit to lend 
art.330 
Due to the limited legal guidelines for private museums, stan-
dard museum best practices are informative in determining wheth-
er an organization meets the requisite public benefit requirement.331 
The American Alliance of Museums (the “AAM”) revised its offi-
cial definition of a museum “to insist only on the use of objects, not 
on their ownership.”332 Any new regulations should adopt a similar 
view as the AAM “Eligibility Criteria,” which requires its member 
museums to “function[] primarily at a physical facility/site[,] . . . 
be open to the public at least 1,000 hours a year[,] . . . and have at 
least one paid professional staff with museum knowledge and expe-
rience.”333 In light of the various challenges in operating a private 
museum—both financially and managerially334—the IRS should 
avoid imposing too high of a standard on these institutions. Based 
on Senator Hatch’s findings, the AAM requirements seem relative-
ly fair when applied to both larger and smaller private art mu-
seums.335 Additionally, any physical facility used to store or display 
                                                                                                                            
330 See supra text accompanying notes 239–42. 
331 See Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9. 
332 SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1. The AAM 
aims to “enhance[e] the ability of museums to serve the public interest . . . .” Id. at 7. 
333 Eligibility Criteria, supra note 327. A museum, by definition must meet the following 
requirements: 
[1] be a legally organized not-for-profit institution or part of a 
nonprofit organization or government entity[;] [2] be essentially 
educational in nature[;] [3] have a formally stated mission[;] [4] use 
and interpret objects and/or a site for the presentation of regularly 
scheduled programs and exhibits[;] [5] have a formal and appropriate 
program of documentation, care, and use of collections and/or 
tangible objects . . . [;] [6] have at least one paid professional staff 
[member] with museum knowledge and experience[;] [7] have a full-
time director to whom authority is delegated for day-to-day-
operations[; and] [7] have the financial resources sufficient to operate 
effectively. 
Id. 
334 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
335 Senator Hatch observed that the lower end of the spectrum for weekly hours of 
operation is about twenty hours per week and equals slightly more than 1,000 hours total 
in a fifty-two-week year. Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. “A 
number of the museums indicated that in addition to being open to the public, they also 
accommodated school groups and other private visitors.” Id.; see also supra text 
accompanying note 262. 
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art must be entirely separate from the donor’s private residence, 
but may be located on the same overall property if the museum is 
situated in a remote area of the estate that affords an appropriate 
amount of privacy.336 
Any new regulations should adopt a flexible approach to donor 
involvement: A reasonable amount of donor control should be 
permitted during the donor-founder’s lifetime, and the donor’s 
family members should be able to participate in the museum’s go-
vernance.337 Donors should be allowed to oversee these charitable 
organizations, or take on a more curatorial role, so long as their in-
volvement is in furtherance of the organization’s tax-exempt pur-
poses.338 The tax law should tolerate some entanglement with do-
nor-founders and their family members—and, in some instances, 
insubstantial private benefits—to promote further investment in 
these jewel-box private museums. Billionaire collectors often have 
a remarkable eye for art, and have the means to buy some of the 
best works available in the contemporary market.339 
2.   Case Study: The Hill Art Foundation 
To illustrate these points, consider the new museum develop-
ment project by billionaire art collector J. Tomilson Hill, Vice 
Chairman of the Blackstone Group.340 Hill decided to open a pri-
vate art museum that “will become one of the few private galleries 
in New York City largely made up of a personal collection.”341  Ac-
cording to Hill, the museum will be primarily comprised of pieces 
from his $800 million private collection, but may also borrow art-
works from collections with which Hill has a relationship.342 De-
spite Hill’s relationship with some of the donors and institutions 
that he plans to partner with, the way the foundation is structured 
                                                                                                                            
336 See infra notes 397–98 and accompanying text. 
337 See infra Part V. 
338 See infra text accompanying notes 378–81; see also supra Section III.B.2 (discussing 
the Glenstone Foundation). 
339 Cf. infra text accompanying notes 380–81. 
340 Robin Pogrebin, A Billionaire Is Opening a Private Art Museum in Manhattan, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/arts/design/a-billionaire-
is-opening-a-private-art-museum-in-manhattan.html [https://perma.cc/SD9Z-C3A4]. 
341 Id. 
342 See id. 
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seems to weigh in favor of tax exemption by virtue of its tremend-
ous public benefits. Though Hill acknowledged that the tax benefits 
were a motivation, he agreed with the IRS’s concern about private 
benefits, stating that “he would never open a gallery near one of his 
residences, as the paper magnate Peter Brant has done . . . .”343 Hill 
does not plan to name the building after himself,344 a similar senti-
ment among other notable collectors.345 Naming a private museum 
after oneself may outwardly reflect the founder’s own significance 
in creating the foundation, but it has little bearing on the actual lev-
el of donor control, or the effectiveness of the organization in ac-
complishing its charitable purposes.346 The foundation will make 
Hill’s collection more accessible to the public—admission will be 
free for visitors, and the gallery space will be open on weekdays and 
Saturdays.347 In response to the growing number of public schools 
that have cut funding for arts programs, the museum will make art 
more accessible for children, and will provide educational arts pro-
graming for local New York City public school students.348 Hill 
plans to partner with other more established institutions in New 
York “like the Studio Museum in Harlem and the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, where Mr. Hill serves on the board.”349 Despite 
the financial incentives and donor involvement, the Hill Founda-
tion highlights the need for private museums to maintain their tax-
exempt status: These operating foundations “provide crucial edu-
cational services . . . [that] are instrumental to continuing” art edu-
cation in communities for children and adults.350 
                                                                                                                            
343 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 208–11. 
344 Pogrebin, supra note 340. 
345 Id. Unlike other private collectors, Mitchell and Emily Rales, prominent art 
collectors and the founders of the Glenstone Foundation, intentionally chose not to name 
the museum after themselves. Message from the Founders, GLENSTONE, http:// 
www.glenstone.org/about [https://perma.cc/RW9Y-A3UY]. 
346 Compare discussion supra Section III.B.2, and infra Section V.C (discussing the 
Glenstone Foundation), with discussion supra Section III.C, and infra Section V.B 
(discussing the Brant Foundation). 
347 Pogrebin, supra note 340. 
348 Id. 
349 Id. 
350 Crawford, supra note 45, at 37. 
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V.   FACTORS TO ASSESS PRIVATE BENEFITS 
“It was not just writing a check to support bricks 
and mortar or an exhibition, but a larger impact of 
what this could mean to the city and all future au-
diences.” – Jennifer Wells Green351 
The Senate Finance Committee Inquiry has drawn widespread 
attention to the art world, signifying the need to reassess how these 
private benefit restrictions apply to private tax-exempt art mu-
seums. The failure to clearly define what constitutes a substantial 
private benefit, or provide these institutions with clear guidelines, 
has allowed some wealthy individuals to take advantage of the 
Code without providing meaningful public benefits.352 According to 
Sheldon Cohen, former Commissioner of the IRS, “when used as 
intended, the tax code’s breaks for art collectors balance private 
interests with the public good.”353 The incidental benefits analysis 
focuses on whether these benefits are substantial enough to jeopard-
ize a private museum’s tax-exempt status.354 Private benefits 
should continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, where cer-
tain factors weigh in favor of exemption more than others. When 
considering the totality of the circumstances, it is practically im-
possible to create a private museum without conferring some bene-
fit on behalf of the donor-founder.355 These organizations should be 
judged by the amount of harm done to the institution, not just the 
public benefit, and should only be held liable or subject to penalties 
where there is evidence of significant abuse.356 
The overall benefits that private museums provide are “a long-
term public good” that far outweigh some of the private benefits 
discussed in Section III.D, such as donor control, or in some cases, 
limited access or hours of operation.357 Private benefits should only 
                                                                                                                            
351 Perman, supra note 63. 
352 Rodgers, supra note 126. 
353 See Kocieniewski, supra note 316. 
354 See discussion supra Section III.C. 
355 See Kocieniewski, supra note 316. Cohen said: “If an art collector makes significant 
contributions, and the public actually gets access to the works they are donating, then the 
major thing the collector gets is prestige and social status.” Id. 
356 See generally Marsh, supra note 156, at 623–24. 
357 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3; see also supra Part III 
(applying the private benefit analysis). 
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be disqualifying in situations where the charitable deductions are 
not being used in furtherance of the organization’s tax-exempt 
purposes.358 This Part illustrates various factors by which to assess 
the private benefit analysis—including the size and scale of mu-
seums, degree of closeness to the donor-founder, physical location, 
and amount of public access—and describes how these guidelines 
should apply to private operating foundations. 
A.   Consider the of Size and Scale of Museums When Examining 
Visitor Data 
Congress should have a say in how tax dollars are spent, but to 
the extent possible, it should evaluate an organization’s tax-exempt 
activities relative to the private benefit.359 Unlike traditional busi-
nesses, it is more difficult for museums to implement objective per-
formance measures to determine whether an organization satisfies 
the public benefit requirement.360 Museums have cautioned against 
using statistical data as objective criteria when determining the ef-
fectiveness of private museums.361 Instead, any evaluation of their 
programming should be on a subjective basis.362 For example, when 
examining museum data, such as visit counts, these institutions 
should be compared to similarly situated institutions (i.e., mu-
seums similar in size, type, exhibition space, tourism, etc.).363 Visi-
tor data is informative: A number of American museums are moti-
vated to maximize their visit counts to generate income from 
sources such as admissions, “sales, exhibition entrance fees,” and 
these numbers often justify the need for greater financial sup-
port.364 
                                                                                                                            
358 See Fricke, supra note 77, at 1166. 
359 Id. 
360 For one, a more objective approach may only assess more symptomatic effects, 
rather than the actual underlying phenomena, similar to the visitor count discussed in 
Section III.D.3. See SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 8. 
Furthermore, statistical data fails to take into many external factors (i.e., the discussion of 
comparing similarly situated institutions). Id. Lastly, any assessment of visitor surveys 
will conflate a more complex relationship between the museumgoer and his environment 
in terms of satisfaction or visitor ratings. Id. at 15. 
361 Id. at 14–15. 
362 Compare discussion supra Section III.D.3., with discussion infra Section V.D. 
363 See SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 9. 
364 Id. at 8. 
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In application, such considerations do not have the same effect 
on richer institutions, and are inherently flawed.365 Visitor data is 
not representative of the overall population—the captured demo-
graphics of museumgoers tend to be highly educated individuals, or 
the “educational elite.”366 Museums’ heavy reliance on donors 
(both financially and to gift artworks) has the effect of “alie-
nat[ing] . . . the general public,” and visitors tend to be upper- and 
middle-class individuals.367 As a result, the general public views 
these institutions as inaccessible: “This ‘elite subordination of the 
museum’ simply affirms the class status of the rich and educated” 
and undermines the organization’s ability to provide meaningful 
public benefits.368 Museums often use the number of visits to indi-
cate their public impact; however, the number of visitors is not 
necessarily equated with public impact.369 In some instances visitor 
data may be useful in making the determination, but should not be 
a determinative factor to merit the revocation of private museum’s 
tax-exempt status, except in egregious cases.370 
                                                                                                                            
365 See id. at 8–9. 
366 Id. at 6–7. 
367 Karayan, supra note 188, at 475. 
368 Id. (quoting FIONA MCLEAN, MARKETING THE MUSEUM 75 (1997)). 
369 “First, the number of visits is not the same as the number of people served.” 
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 8. The number of art 
museumgoers has likely increased—but perhaps not substantially—“over the last few 
decades probably because there are more museums,” and the numbers may include those 
individuals who revisit the same museums or other affiliated institutions. Id. Second, “the 
quality of programs (i.e., the satisfaction they provide users),” is distinguishable from 
“the draw of such programs.” Id. Third, “a shift in priority (and presumably resources) 
from collecting and research to exhibitions and community programs” may not have an 
immediate effect on the number of visits. Id. Successful outreach to new audiences may 
require those individuals to fundamentally change their impressions of museums. Id. 
370 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12 (finding that, in one 
instance, a museum reported that as few as “456 people visited between October 2 and 
November 11, 2015,” whereas another museum averaged 35,000 visitors over a period of 
five years). 
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B.    Donor Involvement—Though Unorthodox—Leads to Innovative 
Results and Should Be Permissible So Long as the Private Benefit Is 
Not Egregious 
To limit donor involvement, it is imperative that private mu-
seums diversify their “funding sources.”371 One approach to en-
sure that these private art museums act in the public interest, is to 
forbid donors and their family members from any involvement in 
the management of the foundation’s assets and governance.372 Mu-
seum founders and their family members often serve on the board 
or in management positions in the foundation—an indicator for 
donor control and abuse.373 Donor-controlled private museums 
“will reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the founder . . . .”374 
However, private museums rely heavily on individual gifts from 
wealthy donors, and may not be able to survive on other methods 
of financial support.375 Organizations primarily led by their found-
ers pose a unique set of challenges, including: “feelings of owner-
ship, board selection, inability or lack of expertise of direct man-
agement of the type of organization that they founded, feeling 
stifled from a staff standpoint, questions of motivation and collabo-
ration from outsiders, and deep public association of the organiza-
tion with the founder.”376 Critics of donor involvement argue that 
private museums will fare better with a more diverse management 
                                                                                                                            
371 Jasmine Kusumowidagdo, Adding Up the Arts: The Great Recession and the Public-
Private Debate in the Funding of America’s Art and Art Museums 32 (Apr. 22, 2016) 
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Scripps College) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
372 Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63. 
373 Cf. Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 675 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Control by an individual who established the foundation is problematic where the founder 
actively participates in its management, or benefits from, or has a significant voice in how 
the organization is operated. E.g., id.; Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 
1324, 1334 (1980), aff’d, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). 
374 Crawford, supra note 45, at 36. A museum is more likely to thrive when it is 
independently governed by “art expert[s] or a diverse group of knowledgeable 
individuals . . . better suited to operate a museum when compared to donors or their 
families.” Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63 (citation omitted). 
375 See Kusumowidagdo, supra note 371, at 26, 32; see also supra Section IV.A.1 
(providing a more robust discussion of the particular set of issues that donor control 
creates for private operating foundations). 
376 Crawford, supra note 45, at 36. 
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structure.377 Any changes, if any, should avoid a blanket prohibition 
against any connection between the donor-founder and the organi-
zation’s governance structure. Too stringent rules may discourage 
organizations where the donor-founder oversees the management 
of the museum, and in turn, has unfettered discretion over how the 
museum provides meaningful public benefits. 
Critics of the private museum phenomenon argue that wealthy 
art collectors may not have a good eye for works, and in turn, are 
ill-equipped to take on curatorial or managerial roles, even in the 
case of their own museums.378 Conversely, in many instances in-
volvement by donors and their family members is compatible with 
the organization’s tax-exempt purpose. The donor-founder is more 
likely than not to be well-versed “in the area in which he or she col-
lects.”379 Private foundations are a reflection of the donor’s acqui-
sition strategy and curatorial insight—private contemporary art 
museums are able to take greater risks than more established mu-
seums.380 Due to the immense amount of wealth attributed to their 
billionaire donor-founders, these private museums are generally 
not subject to the same practical constraints as their public coun-
terparts.381 
For example, the Brant Foundation is directed by the founder’s 
daughter, and the founder, Peter Brant, tends to do a lot of the cu-
rating himself.382 Similar to other wealthy art collectors, Brant is a 
tastemaker, known for his dedication to collecting contemporary 
art.383 Works in his collection include established artists like Andy 
Warhol, who he has collected since the 1960s, and contemporary 
artists, such as Jeff Koons (who he was an early collector of), Dan 
Colen, Julian Schnabel, and Cady Noland.384 In November 2013, 
Brant made a record-breaking sale of Jeff Koons’ Balloon Dog 
                                                                                                                            
377 See Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63. 
378 See Shnayerson, supra note 42. 
379 Marsh, supra note 156, at 623. 
380 PRIVATE COLLECTORS, AND THE PUBLIC BENEFIT, supra note 37. 
381 For discussion of donor aesthetic and financial discretion, see generally supra 
Sections III.A, III.B.1. 
382 See About Us, BRANT FOUND., http://brantfoundation.org/about-us/ [https:// 
perma.cc/QH9Z-79XX] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017); see also Goldstein, supra note 54. 
383 See Goldstein, supra note 54. 
384 Id. 
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(Orange) for $58.4 million at Christie’s auction house, “the highest 
price fetched by the work of a living artist at auction.”385 Brant was 
motivated to sell this incredibly high-value work, in part, because 
he could contribute the proceeds from the sale to the Brant Foun-
dation’s endowment fund to help accomplish his long-term goals 
for the organization.386 The ability for donor-founders and their 
family members to be involved in their own operating foundations 
encourages greater participation by wealthy-individuals in the pri-
vate museum sector, and may lead to unexpected results that have 
a tremendous impact on the cultural landscape. 
Donor-founders have the ability to cultivate their creative vi-
sion to produce remarkable cultural relics. According to its mission 
statement, the Judd Foundation was founded to preserve the legacy 
of the widely-celebrated minimalist artist Donald Judd, and to 
show and preserve his artworks.387 Judd’s two children—who serve 
as the President and Vice President of the Foundation’s board—
helped the organization recover from crippling debt and open new 
spaces across the country.388 The Judd Foundation campus in Mar-
fa, Texas, is a minimalist art mecca that shows “museum-quality” 
artworks and design, and has helped to transform the previously 
desolate desert town into a thriving art destination.389 The Founda-
tion is revered as a model success story of the influential role that 
private museums play within the art world.390 
                                                                                                                            
385 Id. 
386 Id. 
387 About, JUDD FOUND., http://juddfoundation.org/foundation/about/ [https://perma. 
cc/2VUE-QNXT] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
388 See generally Zoë Lescaze, Specific Objectives: The Complex Task of Preserving Donald 
Judd’s Legacy, ARTNEWS (Sept. 12, 2016, 9:15 AM), http://www.artnews.com/2016/ 
09/12/specific-objectives-the-complex-task-of-preserving-donald-judds-legacy/ [https:// 
perma.cc/RN9B-NL3A]. Judd’s children inherited millions of dollars in debt after the 
artist’s premature death; however, the organization has recovered and is now in good 
financial standing. Id.; see also Alexandra Lange, Donald Judd’s House, NEW YORKER 
(May 13, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/donald-judds-house 
[https://perma.cc/YFC2-X85C] (discussing the Judd Foundation’s New York SoHo Loft 
space at 101 Spring Street, which recently underwent “a three-year, twenty-three-million-
dollar restoration process” before opening its doors to the public, after the building was 
left in disrepair). 
389 Lange, supra note 388; see also Lescaze, supra note 388. 
390 See generally Lescaze, supra note 388. 
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Founder-led organizations also create more positive dynamics, 
such as greater innovation, long-term investment in the organiza-
tion’s growth and success, and dedication to the organization’s 
overall charitable purpose.391 Hence, not all involvement by found-
ers or their family members is detrimental to a private museum’s 
charitable purposes. The tax regime should provide private operat-
ing foundations with enough leeway to cultivate their own unique 
collecting strategies and institutional goals, to ensure that these 
“jewel-box” museums continue to thrive and make significant con-
tributions within the nonprofit art museum sector. 
C.   Though the Proximity to the Founder’s Private Residence Is an 
Indicator of Abuse, Private Museums Play a Significant Role in 
Improving Local Economic and Cultural Development 
The IRS advises donors to never display the collection in their 
residences.392 The IRS has revoked tax exemption in cases where a 
taxpayer places artworks on his or her estate, and determined that, 
under section 4941 of the Code, the use of a private foundation’s 
income or assets by a disqualified person constitutes a substantial 
private benefit.393 In Revenue Ruling 74-600, the IRS investigated 
the founder of a private foundation for displaying paintings owned 
by the organization in his home, which were returned to him after 
being exhibited in a number of museums.394 There is likely to be a 
substantial private benefit when a donor displays artwork within his 
or her home, considering that this practice is outside the scope of 
standard museum operations.395 As the Committee pointed out, it 
                                                                                                                            
391 See Perman, supra note 63. See generally discussion supra Section IV.B. 
392 See Rev. Rul, 74-600, 1974-2 C.B 385; see also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 20, at 
1300. 
393 See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. The IRS took notice of “the limited 
use by others,” and the fact that there were no signs to advise the public that they were 
welcome to tour the property. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-24-001 (Nov. 5, 1987). While some 
of the sculptures were viewable from the road, and “in theory available to the general 
public, it [was] primarily only those who [were] affiliated with the art museums and 
schools who receive full advantage of their availability.” Id. 
394 Rev. Rul, 74-600, 1974-2 C.B 385. Even though 2,000 individuals visited the 
founder’s private collection each year, including special tour groups, the IRS ruled that 
the founder was “in direct use of the foundation’s assets.” Id. The IRS determined that 
the placement of the panting in the founder’s residence constituted a private benefit, and 
thus, disqualified the foundation’s status as a tax-exempt organization. Id. 
395 See id.; see also Kleinman & Spell, supra note 240. 
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is more ambiguous when a private museum displays its collection 
near or on the founder’s property.396 In some instances, a donor 
should be allowed to build a tax-exempt museum near or on her 
property, so long as the building is clearly marked with signage, 
publicly accessible, and does not possess any qualities of artifice 
(i.e., constructed with the intent to manipulate the Code).397 How-
ever, this option is likely limited to a particular subset of “donors 
with estates that are large enough to” build a structure on an en-
tirely separate portion of their property with a suitable amount of 
privacy.398 Certain practical considerations may also deter private 
collectors from exhibiting their artworks within their homes.399 
Many donors are opening unique exhibition spaces such as ware-
houses, or newly designed private art museums and exhibition 
spaces, to accommodate modern artworks, which are often large-
scale installations or works that require special attention such as 
video art.400 
Consider Glenstone, which is located in an “improbable 
place[] . . . separated from the Rales’ home by a large duck pond,” 
and has attendance records of roughly 10,000 visitors from 2006 to 
2013.401 Though this arrangement may appear suspect, the mu-
seum provides greater public benefits that warrant tax exemption. 
Glenstone houses a remarkable collection of post-war and contem-
porary art, and has lent more than 400 artworks to other arts insti-
tutions, both domestically and internationally.402 Images of the mu-
seum’s permanent collection, exhibitions, and artworks on loan are 
                                                                                                                            
396 For discussion of Senator Hatch’s findings, see generally supra Section III.D. 
397 See, e.g., Kleinman & Spell, supra note 240 (discussing Rev. Rul, 74-600, 1974-2 C.B 
385). A museum should be “well publicized, [and] physically separated from the donor’s 
personal living spaces.” Id.; see also Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 
3. 
398 Kleinman & Spell, supra note 240. To avoid an adverse ruling, it is preferable that 
the structure not be attached to the donor’s residence. See id. The location should be 
permissible so long as the donor did not utilize the collection for personal use, and opens 
the private exhibition space to the public. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 20, at 1300. 
399 Kino, supra note 48. 
400 Id. 
401 Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
402 See id.; see also Form 990, supra note 192, at pt. IX, Attachment 15. 
928         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:869 
 
available online.403 Furthermore, Glenstone aims to increase its 
numbers to 25,000 annually, and is also undergoing a new expan-
sion project that is expected to increase its visitors four or five-
fold.404 Allowing taxpayers to found a museum on their property 
incentivizes participation, and is likely more cost-effective for do-
nors.405 Nearly sixty percent of private museums are located near 
their founder’s residences.406 To rule against the ability to build 
tax-exempt exhibition spaces near their homes would likely create 
detrimental effects on the private museum sector. 
Critics may also object to the placement of museums in rural 
areas, particularly when placed near the founder’s personal resi-
dence.407 For example, In re Barnes Foundation, the Barnes Founda-
tion was ordered to move from its original rural location to Phila-
delphia.408 While its new home provides greater visibility, and has 
elevated the museum to an internationally renowned institution, 
there is still merit in placing museums in less densely populated 
rural communities.409 Nearly twenty-six percent of museums, pri-
vate and public, are located in rural areas.410 Museums can have 
tremendous economic effects, and help to develop both rural and 
urban communities: Museums help generate tourism, create jobs, 
encourage community engagement, and provide enriching cultural 
experiences for visitors.411 The majority of museums’ mission 
statements reflect a “community-focused spirit.”412 
                                                                                                                            
403 See Art, GLENSTONE, http://www.glenstone.org/art [https://perma.cc/PA5R-
5VKR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
404 Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15. 
405 See, e.g., supra notes 128–30, 277 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 427–31 
and accompanying text. 
406 Crawford, supra note 45, at 40. 
407 For historical background on the Barnes Foundation, see supra Section III.B.1. 
408 See In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *1, *19 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
Dec. 13, 2004). 
409 “The arts help to address some of the unique challenges faced by rural communities, 
including geographic isolation, infrastructure limitations and population flight.” NAT’L 
ASSEMBLY OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, supra note 125, at 10. Private art museums “can 
help to diversify rural economies by creating sustainable small businesses, improving 
quality of life for residents, and attracting visitors and investment.” Id. 
410 Museum Facts, supra note 51. 
411 Crawford, supra note 45, at 37. 
412 Id. at 40. 
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In the context of urban development, “the focus is simply on 
the presence of the museum in the community, rather than the 
specific offerings found within the museum . . . .”413 For example, 
the Rubell Family Collection helped transform the Miami arts dis-
trict after opening in a former Drug Enforcement Administration 
warehouse in 1993, and now draws tens of thousands of visitors 
each year.414 Founded by Mera and Donald Rubell, the Rubell 
Family Collection is one of the most notable modern art collections 
in the United States, and has expanded to rival prominent arts in-
stitutions such as the Whitney Museum of American Art in New 
York.415 The Rubell Family Collection created ripple effects across 
the country—more prominent art collectors began to take notice of 
the private art foundation phenomenon, and modeled their own 
private foundations on this “Miami [Organizational] Model.”416 
More private foundations followed suit and situated themselves in 
this once blighted neighborhood, which has developed into Mi-
ami’s now thriving arts district.417 Iconic art museums can substan-
tially impact economic regeneration in their communities.418 These 
institutions serve as “cultural attractions” that help “stimulate 
business development and allow communities to profit from the 
growing market of cultural tourism.”419 
D.   Public Benefit Calls for Greater Public Access 
To satisfy the provisions of section 501(c)(3), private museums 
must provide tangible public benefits, which implies that there 
should be some degree of access by the general public.420 While the 
exact meaning of public benefit is unclear in the context of private 
operating foundations, the general consensus is to consider the ef-
fects that a museum has on its visitors as a central tenet of museum 
policy.421 The act of accessioning an artwork confers on the mu-
                                                                                                                            
413 Karayan, supra note 188, at 477. 
414 Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15. 
415 Kino, supra note 48. 
416 Crawford, supra note 45, at 3. 
417 See id. 
418 Plaza et al., supra note 252, at 180–82. 
419 Karayan, supra note 188, at 477. 
420 See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. 
421 SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 6. 
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seum an inherent obligation to serve in the public interest with re-
spect to the donated artwork.422 In the art world, the donation of an 
artwork to a museum is in itself “considered the ultimate boon to 
the public good,” whereas Congress  is suspicious of “any charita-
ble deduction that is not backed by a concrete act of giving . . . , 
even if the end result benefits ‘[a]rt.’”423 To best serve its overall 
charitable purposes, a private museum’s hours of operation should 
be reasonable in proportion to the foundation’s resources, and 
should not be so unfriendly to deter visits from potential museum-
goers.424 It is fairly common for museums to operate only a few 
days a week, thus smaller private museums should not be expected 
to be open more than three or four days a week.425 
The same logic should be applied to museum admission fees 
and reservation systems.426 For 2014 and 2015, museumgoers 
“spent an average of eight dollars per visit,” and only one-third 
offered free admission.427 Though the cost for a museum visit 
seems relatively low, the median investment for each individual 
visitor is about fifty-five dollars,428 and this high cost requires mu-
seums to earmark a portion of their operating budgets to subsidize 
the cost of admission.429 Any public benefit assessment must con-
                                                                                                                            
422 See Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9. 
423 Strom, supra note 286. 
424 For discussion of the Hall Foundation’s admissions policies, see supra note 263. The 
Hall Foundation had about 1,500 visitors from 2013 to 2014, and operates three days a 
week for a period lasting only six months per year. Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next 
Door, supra note 3. 
425 Cf. Location, Hours, and Admission, MUSEUM MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/ 
visit/index [https://perma.cc/2RCF-G3LZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). MoMA PS1, an 
affiliate of the Museum of Modern Art in Manhattan, is closed on Tuesdays and 
Wednesdays. Id. 
426 For a discussion of various museum’s admission policies, see supra Section III.D.3. 
427 ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS BY THE NUMBERS 2015 1, 6 (2016), 
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/Art%20Museums%20By%20The%20Nu
mbers%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX75-MEPU] (noting that “the average amount 
visitors spent per museum visit . . . include[s] the cost of admission and any ancillary 
purchases (internal punctuation omitted)); cf. John, supra note 22. The average cost of 
admission has steadily increased since 2012, when “[t]he average price for admission 
[was] about seven dollars, and . . . [t]he median cost to museums per visitor [was] about 
$31.40.” John, supra note 22. 
428 ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., supra note 427. 
429 John, supra note 22. Slightly more than one-third of museums offer free admission, 
or suggested admission fees. Id.; cf. Museum Facts, supra note 51. 
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sider the costs of running a private operating foundation, and the 
financial ramifications of any new policy changes for the private 
museum sector. Increases in the number of visitors and hours of 
operation affect “security, insurance, and museum staffing 
costs[,] . . . [which] are not usually covered by increased attendance 
and admission charges.”430 Smaller organizations with less funding 
may not be able to survive if free admission was mandatory for pri-
vate museums. This evinces the need for continued tax subsidies to 
help arts institutions better sustain themselves, especially when 
private museums help to alleviate government spending within the 
arts sector.431 
Despite Senator Hatch’s misgivings about appointment-only 
and advanced reservation systems, this is standard practice for mu-
seums.432 Reservations are common among more established public 
museums.433 The National Museum of African-American History 
and Culture (“NMAAHC”) in Washington, D.C., has quickly as-
cended in the ranks to become one of the most popular “superstar 
museums” in the country.434 The NMAAHC has welcomed over 
750,000 visitors since opening in September 2016—far more than 
originally anticipated.435 The NMAAHC offers free admission, but 
requires visitors to reserve timed entry passes.436 Passes are fully 
booked several months in advance, though the museum allows a 
limited number of same-day visits.437 Private museums should also 
                                                                                                                            
430 THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 224. 
431 For discussion on the economic decline in government spending in the nonprofit 
museum sector, see supra Section I.B. 
432 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. 
433 Id.; see also supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text. 
434 See Heather Long, New African-American Museum ‘Sold Out’ Through March 2017, 
CNN (Oct. 24, 2016, 9:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/21/news/economy/ 
museum-of-african-america-history-and-culture-passes [https://perma.cc/YGM7-7Z64]. 
435 More Options for Visiting the National Museum of African American History and Culture 
Starting Jan. 4, SMITHSONIAN: NEWSDESK (Jan. 4, 2017), http://newsdesk.si.edu/ 
releases/more-options-visiting-national-museum-african-american-history-and-culture-
starting-jan-4 [https://perma.cc/LBS3-PMN7] [hereinafter More Options for Visiting]. 
“The museum did conduct a study prior to the opening, and accordingly expected 7,500 
visitors daily. Instead, 30,000 people have tried to get in some days. (The museum can 
admit about 8,000).” Long, supra note 434. 
436 More Options for Visiting, supra note 435. 
437 Long, supra note 434. As of October 2016, passes were sold out through March 2017. 
Id. 
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accommodate same-day appointments to allow for more spontane-
ous visits, but should not be required to provide all same-day visi-
tors admission when they are in high demand.438 Similar to the 
NMAAHC, the Broad Museum in Los Angeles, California, has 
been so popular since opening its doors in September 2015 that 
wait times for same-day admission range from ten to forty-five mi-
nutes on weekdays, and from sixty to ninety minutes on week-
ends.439 The museum recently changed its reservation system to 
make it easier for visitors to book free tickets online.440 Glenstone 
requires scheduled visits, but unlike other institutions, appoint-
ments may be scheduled on the same day and are free.441 Once 
Glenstone completes its expansion project in 2018, it will continue 
the reservation system “on its website to make sure that everyone 
enjoys an unhurried and less crowded experience.”442 While these 
in-demand museums may serve as a model, private museums 
should aim to create admission policies that cater best to their fi-
nancial and institutional needs. 
Last, the availability of online catalogues of a private museum’s 
art collection is a positive factor that weighs in favor of exemption, 
but should only be examined in light of the museum’s available re-
sources. An increasing number of museums are digitizing their 
holdings, but this is a lofty and expensive undertaking to imple-
ment. A museum’s website is a good measure of online activity 
(not the outcome), provides beneficial resources, and can maximize 
public engagement.443 
                                                                                                                            
438 See generally Jessica Gelt, Adapting to Demand, Broad Museum Changes Its Ticket 
Reservation System, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016, 3:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-broad-museum-ticket-reservations-20160426-story. 
html [https://perma.cc/DPE7-NZ87]. After appointments started filling up three to four 
months in advance, the Broad limited visitors’ ability to book reservations up to one 
month in advance. Id.; see also note 61 and accompanying text. 
439 Gelt, supra note 438. 
440 Id. 
441 Admission to Glenstone Is Always Free, GLENSTONE, http://www.glenstone.org/ 
admission-glenstone-always-free [https://perma.cc/86DL-FW3P] (last visited Apr. 13, 
2017). 
442 Halperin, supra note 44. 
443 SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 13. 
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CONCLUSION 
More wealthy art collectors are founding private museums than 
ever before. Although tax breaks for high-income individuals have 
recently come under fire due to concern over private benefits, this 
does not justify doing away with charitable deductions for private 
art museums altogether. By nature, tax incentives confer some sort 
of benefit on the founder, and should not disqualify an organization 
unless the private interests at stake significantly outweigh the pub-
lic benefit. However, a museum’s policies and programmatic ef-
forts should ensure that the organization safeguards the public in-
terest, and provides a beneficial service to society. The Code 
should preserve these institutions’ tax-exempt status where appro-
priate, and should not enact overly prescriptive regulations that 
would hinder the private museum sector’s ability to grow. Whether 
these private operating foundations satisfy the public benefit re-
quirement under section 501(c)(3) should continue to be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis. This analysis considers whether the mu-
seum’s activities fulfill its tax-exempt charitable purpose, in light of 
the organization’s available resources and funding. In all, it is bet-
ter to tolerate some private benefit during the donor-founder’s life-
time, so long as it is not egregious. The Code should continue to 
encourage wealthy donors to create their own private operating 
foundations: These private art institutions provide invaluable pub-
lic benefits, promote growth in the nonprofit museum sector, and 
safeguard priceless artworks for the benefit of future generations. 
By allowing donor-founders to carry out their unique vision, private 
museums provide greater autonomy for these institutions to culti-
vate more avant-gardes collections, and can lead to innovative and 
unexpected results. 
 
